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vAbstract
Supply Chain Coordination Contracts with Free Replacement Warranty
Wan-ting Hu
Advisor: Banerjee, Avijit PhD; Kim, Seung-Lae PhD
This thesis investigates a coordination mechanism for a supply chain with one man-
ufacturer and one retailer in a single period, single product newsvendor model. It looks
beyond the conventional supply chain coordination problem by incorporating a specific form
of warranties. The manufacturer provides a free replacement warranty in case of product
failure within a specified after-sale interval. We assume that the expected value of stochastic
market demand is an increasing function of this warranty period length. The supply chain
is coordinated if its optimal actions (production quantity and warranty length) are realized
while each party maximizes its own respective profit. Any deviation by either party from
the terms of a coordinated contract cannot improve its performance.
We consider different types of contracts between the two parties: a wholesale price only
or a revenue sharing contract with shared warranty costs or such costs borne by the man-
ufacturer alone. The manufacturer decides the warranty period, K, and other contract
parameters, such as the wholesale price, shares of revenue, and warranty cost sharing ar-
rangements. The retailer accepts the contract and determines the order amount, as long as
it is able to make positive profit. The manufacturer then produces and delivers the order
quantity for the selling season. Each party makes its decisions to maximize its own profit,
hence the realized decisions may differ from the supply chain’s optimal solutions, if the con-
tract is not coordinated. Thus, we examine whether the supply chain can be coordinated
under each type of contract outlined above. For coordinated contracts we focus on the issue
of profit allocation. If a contract type is non-coordinating, we attempt to highlight the fac-
tors that affect its efficiency, where the efficiency of a non-coordinating contract is defined
as the ratio of realized supply chain profit over its optimal profit.
vi
The results obtained from this research leads to some interesting managerial insights. Under
the wholesale price only contract types, we find that even if the retailer is willing to share
the warranty fulfillment costs with the manufacturer, the resulting supply chain profit is
less than the optimal value, leading to suboptimal performance. Under a revenue sharing
contract, however, the production/ order quantity and the warranty length are coordinated,
if the warranty costs are shared by the two parties in the same proportion as the profits.
The profit allocation of each party under coordination is flexible from 0 to 100% of chain
profit. This concept is illustrated by a numerical example of additive demand case followed
by an extensive sensitivity analysis, which leads to some important insight.
The major contribution of this thesis is its novel aspect of considering warranty period
optimization towards supply chain coordination. We provide the guidelines for designing a
contract between a manufacturer and a retailer so that the supply chain’s performance is
optimized in terms of the production/ order quantity and the warranty period, while each
party in the chain achieves its maximal profit. Without the presence of a third party, the
contract coordinates the supply chain with less cost. A non-coordinating contract may still
be desirable if it entails relatively low administrative cost while achieving a high degree of
efficiency, as defined before. The concepts developed here are easy to implement in real
world supply chain, and can provide valuable insights into more complex types of supply
chain contracts.

10.1 List of Notations
D demand over the considered selling season (1)
p product price ($ /unit) (1)
K warranty interval in years (1)
Q retailer’s order amount in units (1)
W wholesale price ($ /unit) (1)
f(·|K) probability density function of demand over selling season for any given K (1)
F (·|K) cumulative probability function of demand over selling season for any given K (1)
cs manufacturer’s production cost ($ /unit) (1)
cr retailer’s procuring cost ($ /unit) (1)
c supply chain’s product cost ($ /unit); c = cs + cr (1)
v salvage value ($ /unit) (1)
gs manufacturer’s lost sales cost ($ /unit) (1)
gr retailer’s lost sale cost ($ /unit) (1)
g supply chain’s lost sale cost ($ /unit); g = gs + gr (1)
r replacement cost for each warranty claim ($ /unit) (1)
Y years until a product fails in time units (1)
1
β mean failure time of products in years (1)
N number of products that fail during the warranty period (1)
φ % of revenue, taken by the retailer in the revenue sharing contract (1)
θ % of warranty cost, borne by the retailer in the revenue and warranty sharing contract (1)
21. Introduction
The thesis considers some types of contracts as coordination mechanisms for a manufac-
turer’s warranty of free product replacement, if a product fails within a specific after-sale
interval. Research interest in supply chain coordination via contracts has grown rapidly and
a number of different possibilities have been explored over the past ten years or so. We
consider in this research a new scenario where the warranty decision needs to be coordi-
nated with the supply chain’s production level. We first introduce the concept of supply
chain coordination, review current research in supply chain coordination and warranty re-
lated matters. The behaviors of different types of contracts towards coordinating the supply
chain and their coordination flexibility are investigated. Finally, we examine the efficiency
of a class of non-coordinating contracts.
A typical supply chain consists of suppliers, distributors, retailers and end customers. Raw
materials are procured, and various products are produced at one or more factories, shipped
to warehouses for intermediate storage, and then transported to retailers to reach end cus-
tomers. Consequently, to reduce associated costs and improve customer service, effective
strategies, policies and operational decisions must take into account the interactions be-
tween different stages, requiring advanced supply chain management techniques. Supply
chain management is a set of approaches used to effectively integrate the parties involved
in the various stages of a chain so that the systemwide costs are minimized while satisfying
each party’s profit requirements. It is an integrated holistic approach for systems, often
involving considerable real world complexities.
Research in Supply Chain Management has grown dramatically in the past decade as firms
have intensified efforts to streamline the operations for competing in a global economic en-
vironment. Market’s pressure for lower prices, better quality and higher levels of services
3present significant challenges to today’s supply chains, forcing retailers, transporters and
manufacturers to achieve greater cost efficiencies and improve after-sales service. Supply
chain efficiency is, thus, a key factor in gaining competitive advantage. At the same time,
with the proliferation of the internet and the development of robust business-to-business
(B2B) technologies, supply chain solutions are scalable, in conjunction with automated
information exchanges between trading partners. These make the collaboration and coor-
dination among supply chain players possible. Such opportunities, however, introduce new
challenges and complexities. Different stages in supply chains frequently have different, con-
flicting objectives. Each party is primarily concerned with optimizing its own objectives
which may sacrifice the entire chain’s overall performance. For instance, manufacturers typ-
ically want retailers to commit themselves to purchasing large quantities of a product in
stable volumes with flexible delivery dates. Unfortunately, most retailers need to be flexible
to their customers’ needs and changing demands. They are also conservative in the order
amount, as they usually undertake the risk of excess inventories. The actual order quantity
may not coincide with the supply chain optimum. There exist opportunities, nevertheless,
that if they make decisions as if they were part of an integrated, seamless pipeline, the entire
supply chain optimum is achieved, and each party may be better off as they now share a
bigger pie.
Companies see significant leverage in coordinating the supply chain. How to align incentives
with the total chain objectives remains a question. One way is to introduce an independent
third party authority that proposes global optimal decisions for all the parties to follow and
allocates profits after the selling season. If the manufacturer and retailer are parts of a larger
supply chain owned by a single corporate entity, this entity may act as a third party and
force coordination of the supply chain. However, the cost of coordination incurred by a third
party and spent during the process may make such an arrangement impractical. Besides,
keeping the third party fair and neutral presents new challenges. With more supply chain
members involved in a transaction, the complexity increases significantly, which may incur
4transaction and service delays. There may exist a way to ensure the proper alignment of
incentives without presence of a third party authority. It has been shown that a properly
designed contract can coordinate the chain automatically through appropriate risk sharing
and profit allocation. Over the last decade, the issue of supply chain coordination through
a variety of contract structures has attracted the attention of many researchers, resulting in
substantial contributions to the literature.
A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the adoption of a set of supply chain
optimal decisions by the respective constituents results in the optimization of the objective
of each of them. The most studied issue in this respect is the coordination of the retailer’s
order quantity (which in the single buyer, single vendor, single period environment is the
same as the manufacturer’s production quantity) with the supply chain’s optimum quantity.
A number of different supply chain coordinating contract types are identified. It is shown
that in a simple newsvendor problem, buyback contracts (Pasternack, 1985), revenue shar-
ing contracts (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005), quantity flexibility contracts (Tsay, 1999), sales
rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002; Krishnan, Kapuscinski, & Butz, 2004) and quantity discount
contracts (Moorthy, 1987) can coordinate the production quantity of a supply chain. The
related compliance regime (Chen, 1999; Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Porteus, 2000) and ad-
ministration cost related matters are also discussed by these authors.
Within the literature pertaining to supply chain coordination with contracts, however, no
existing research sufficiently addresses the incorporation of manufacture’s warranty as a co-
ordination mechanism.
As a common practice in industry, warranties have received the attention of researchers
from many diverse disciplines. Menke (1969) and Lowerre (1968) conducted probabilistic
analyses of warranty costs under free replacement warranties with a rebate. Subsequently,
warranty related issues have been examined in legal, economic, behavioral, marketing and
5management science contexts from implementation and operational impact perspectives. A
comprehensive review of this research area in different disciplines can be found in (Blischke
& Murthy, 1996).
A great deal of work has been done by operations researchers in exploring various aspects
of manufacturer’s warranties, such as warranty types (Blischke & Murthy, 1992, 1994; Dja-
maludin, Murthy, & Blischke, 1996; Murthy & Jack, 2003), product failures during warranty
period (Gerner & Bryant, 1980), warranty claims (Barlow & Hunter, 1960; Wasserman,
1992), warranty costs (Menke, 1969; Lowerre, 1968), and warranty logistics (Murthy, Solem,
& Roren, 2004; Alfredsson, 1997; Cassady, Murdock, & Pohl, 2001; Cohen & Lee, 1990;
Jack & Van der Duyn Schouten, 2000). Studies examining the impact of warranties in a
supply chain context are rare. Consequently, questions regarding optimal warranty strategy
for a supply chain and incentives necessary for adopting specific warranty policies, etc. have
remained largely unanswered to date.
Manufacturer’s warranties may involve free replacement, and/ or coverage of parts and/
or labor work, and/ or parts repair in case of product failure within a specified interval. It
is known that a longer warranty period signals the manufacturer’s confidence in its prod-
ucts quality and tends to boost sales. Automobiles produced by Hyundai and Kia are well
known for their extensive warranty coverage, whereas GM and Ford have recently extended
the powertrain warranty for their 2007 vehicles from 3 years/36,000 miles to 5 years/100,000
miles and 5 years/60,000 miles respectively (Scherer, 2006). Such extensions have helped
GM, particularly, in instilling a higher level of confidence regarding product quality in the
minds of consumers. This has resulted in higher sales, bringing greater profit (Connelly,
2006). After the GM upgrades, several imported brands have offered broader powertrain
coverage on their 2007 vehicles. Mitsubishi now offers warranty coverage over 10 years or
100,000 miles. Similarly Suzuki vehicles have powertrain warranty coverage for 7 years or
100,000 miles (Scherer, 2006).
6Longer warranty periods, however, imply higher warranty service costs. These costs in-
clude the costs of spare parts, costs associated with operating a service center, shipping
costs and those involving handling of claims. For a product having a certain level of quality,
a longer warranty implies more warranty claims, and consequently, the manufacturer needs
to hold larger spare parts inventories and have larger service center capacity. This raises the
interesting question concerning the optimal warranty period, which will result in maximum
supply chain profit. We explore a number of such contracts that align the manufacturer’s
warranty incentive with the chain, and investigate the impact of exogenous parameters on
the coordinated decisions. If a contract does not coordinate the supply chain, We analyze
its efficiency, as defined above.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate some of the questions raised above. We con-
sider a newsvendor environment for a two echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and
one retailer dealing with a single product. The manufacturer offers the end customers a
free replacement warranty (FRW) if the product fails within a stipulated interval after sale
or delivery. Both the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions to maximize their
respective individual profit. The following events occur during the decision process:
• The manufacturer decides the warranty period K in time units;
• In addition, the manufacturer determines the contract parameters, i.e. wholesale price
W and/or each party’s share of revenue φ, as well as that pertaining warranty servicing
costs θ, and offers the contract to the retailer;
• the retailer decides whether to accept or reject the contract offer; it will accept it if
its expected profit is positive;
• if the retailer accepts the contract, it decides the order quantityQ based on the demand
forecast given K;
• the manufacturer produces and delivers Q to the retailer before the selling season
7begins;
• demand is realized;
• as some of the sold products start failing within the warranty period, the manufacturer
handles the claims in honoring the terms of the free replacement warranty;
• all transfer payments are made between the two supply chain members after the sales
season based on the terms of the contract.
During this process, the manufacturer attempts to optimize its expected profit in deciding
the warranty period and other contract parameters while the retailer attempts to optimize
its own expected profit by determining the order quantity. The manufacturer understands
that a longer warranty period results in a demand forecast with a higher expected value,
and the retailer will order a larger quantity, albeit with higher expected warranty service
costs. A higher unit price can bring in more unit profit, but also discourages the retailer
from ordering a large amount. There is a tradeoff between better service and costs, as well
as price and quantity. The tradeoff for the retailer lies in the inventory risks. Holding large
inventories for the season reduces potential shortage loss but increases the risk of leftover
stock. For both parties, the manufacturer and the retailer, under each contract, there exists
a set of optimal actions (for example, optimal warranty period and wholesale price for the
manufacturer and the optimal order quantity for the retailer) that maximizes their respec-
tive profits. This set may be different across different contracts. For instance, Cachon and
Lariviere (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005) have shown that under a revenue sharing contract the
optimal order quantity for the retailer is more than that under a wholesale only contract.
These optimal actions will be realized as both parties behave rationally and selfishly to opti-
mize their own decisions. We assume each party enjoys full knowledge of market information
and relevant data covering the other party, such as demand distribution, the retailer’s and
manufacture’s cost parameters. The optimization process can be described as follows: The
manufacturer knows that for any warranty length, K, there will be a demand distribution
with respect to K: f(D|K). Based on this demand forecast, the retailer will determine an
8optimal order quantity Q∗r in response to the contract offer from the manufacturer. That is,
given K, the final realized actions will be among the set of pairs (contracti, Q∗r(contracti)).
The manufacturer thus maximizes its profit by choosing the optimal contract contract∗s and
expect the retailer’s response Q∗r(contract
∗
s). This optimal contract differs with different
warranty length K. That is, for Kj , there exist at least one optimal contract contract∗s(Kj)
such that (contract∗s(Kj), Q
∗
r(contract
∗
s)) maximizes its profit given Kj . It then optimizes
over K to find the optimal K∗ so that (K∗, contract∗s(K
∗), Q∗r(contract
∗
s)) maximizes its
profit among all the decisions it can make. It offers this contract to the retailer and informs
about it the warranty decision. The retailer then orders the quantity as expected.
The supply chain assumes to take the warranty risk and inventory risk. If there exists
a neutral third party on behalf of the supply chain, it will optimize the chain through the
production and warranty decisions (Q and K). The chain is coordinated if the manufacturer
and retailer’s decisions fall into the optimal decision sets of the supply chain.
We investigate this newsvendor model under four different contract types: a wholesale price
only contract with manufacturer taking warranty cost; a wholesale price only contract with
warranty cost sharing; a revenue sharing contract with manufacturer bearing warranty costs;
a revenue sharing contract with warranty cost sharing. We examine the supply chain’s opti-
mal decision set (Q∗,K∗). Under each contract, we first check with any determined K as to
what contract offer aligns the retailer’s order quantity with the supply chain’s optimum and
whether the manufacturer is willing to offer such a contract. If yes, we examine the flexi-
bility of the profit allocation under coordination. High flexibility is preferred because this
indicates the contract adoption is not limited by the relative power positions of the parties.
If a coordinating contract can allocate profits arbitrarily, then there always exists a contract
that Pareto dominates a non-coordinating contract, i.e., each firm’s profit is no worse off
and at least one firm is strictlybetter off with the coordinating contract. (Cachon, 2003) We
then examine whether the warranty length K can be coordinated by a subset of contract
9offers in the above coordinating set. Our results show that the wholesale only contracts
never coordinate the order quantity, no matter the warranty costs are shared or not. The
revenue sharing contract without warranty cost sharing coordinates the order quantity with
full flexibility of profit allocation, but coordinates the warranty with only one allocation.
The revenue and warranty cost sharing contract, as the best among four, coordinates both
decisions, if the share of the warranty cost equal to the share of revenue for each party.
Theory is then tested in a deterministic additive demand case. The coordinating contract
parameters and profit allocations are obtained. We then considered a fair and equitable
profit allocation as sharing profit according to each party’s relevant cost. We prove this
can be realized by defining the warranty share as same as the proportion of retailer’s unit
wholesale and procuring cost to manufacturer’s unit production cost. Theory is then tested
in a deterministic additive demand case.
Although coordination and flexible profit allocation are desirable features, contracts with
those properties might be costly to administer if they require extra information collection
and coordination actions. As a result, a simple non-coordinating contract may be worth
adopting if it is “efficient”. The efficiency of a non-coordinating contract is defined as the
ratio of supply chain profit with the contract to the supply chain’s optimal profit. We in-
vestigate the efficiency of wholesale price only contract and theoretically prove that higher
wholesale price lowers retailer’s profit and makes the supply chain less efficient; improvement
in production cost, warranty cost and quality helps to build a more efficient supply chain.
The paper is organized as follows: in Chapter 2 we review the current research in sup-
ply chain coordination and warranty; in Chapter 3 we explore the optimal solutions of order
quantity and warranty policy for the supply chain; in Chapter 4 and 5 the wholesale con-
tract and revenue sharing contract are analyzed for supply chain coordination; in Chapter
6 we provide a guideline to allocate supply chain profit at coordination in a fair manner;
in Chapter 7 we investigate how quality improvement will affect our optimal solutions and
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benefit the supply chain; in Chapter 8 we test our theory in additive demand; in section
9 we derive the efficiency of wholesale only contract and explore how different parameters
affect supply chain efficiency; in Chapter 10 we provide numerical examples and conduct
some sensitivity analysis. The proof of lemmas and theorems is available in Appendix 1,
and concavity check in Appendix 2. The tables and figures are provided in Appendix 3 and
4.
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2. Literature Survey
2.1 Warranty Literature
2.1.1 Background
Modern industrialized societies are characterized by (Murthy, Solem, & Roren, 2004)
• new products (consumer durable, industrial and commercial products) appearing at
an ever-increasing rate on the market,
• products getting more complex (due to technology advances),
• more demanding customers and,
• more stringent government regulations regarding product liability.
Buyers of product want assurance that the product will perform satisfactorily over a reason-
able lifetime. To satisfy that need, manufacturers provide post-sale support that includes
instruction and training, repair and maintenance, follow-on sales among others. As an im-
portant component of post-sale support service, warranty offered by a manufacturer or a
dealer establishes liability among the two parties (manufacturer and buyer) in the event
that an item fails. It is a contractual obligation in connection with the sale of a product
(Murthy & Blischke, 1992). The warranty specifies that the manufacturer/ dealer agrees to
rectify certain defects or failures in the product for a specified period of time (sometimes
within specified amount of cost) after the sale of the product.
According to Murthy et al. (2004), warranties serve different purposes for buyer and seller.
From the buyer’s point of view, the main role of a warranty is protectional; it provides a
means of redress if the item, when properly used, fails to perform as intended or as specified
by the seller. Specifically, the warranty assures the buyer that a faulty item will either be
repaired or replaced at no cost or at reduced cost. A second role is informational. Many
12
buyers infer that a product with a relatively long warranty period is a more reliable and
long-lasting product than one with a shorter warranty period.
Warranty is becoming an increasingly important dimension of competitive strategy for man-
ufacturer. It is an integral part of the bundle of satisfaction which the buyer receives when
he purchases a product. The three major objectives of warranty are promotional, protective
and profitable.
Promotional Warranty The promotional warranty is designed to encourage purchases
by reducing risks for the consumer. It usually promises extensive service or complete
satisfaction, and its duration often covers a significant proportion of the life span
of the product (Udell & Anderson, 1968). Since buyers believe long warranty often
signals higher quality, warranty has been used as an effective advertising tool. It is
often adopted when marketing new and innovative products, which may be viewed
with a degree of uncertainty by many potential consumers; or with significant qual-
ity improvement and customers awareness being rebuilt. GM and Ford has just ex-
tended the powertrain warranty for their 2007 vehicles from 3 years/36,000 miles to 5
years/100,000 miles and 5 years/60,000 miles respectively (Scherer, 2006). It helped to
establish a higher confidence level of product quality among customers, which resulted
in higher volume of contracts, bringing greater profit (Connelly, 2006). In addition,
warranty is also an instrument, similar to product performance and price, used in
competition with other manufacturers in the marketplace.
Protective Warranty The purpose of protective warranty is to guard the manufacturer/
dealer from unreasonable claims of purchasers. It Warranty terms often specify the use
and conditions of use for which the product is intended, and limits the manufacturer’s
responsibility to defects in materials and manufacturing which develop in the normal
or improper use of the product during the warranty time. (Udell & Anderson, 1968)
Profitable Warranty Priced extended warranty also contributes significantly to the prof-
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its of the manufacturer. Typically, the profit margin for post-sale service is roughly
30% as opposed to 10% on the initial sale. Due to the fierce competition, most elec-
tronic and automobile manufacturers are surviving due to the profits made on offering
extended warranties (Murthy, Solem, & Roren, 2004).
To the public policy makers the warranty plays a statutory role to enact laws to see that
warranty terms are fair and there are mechanisms to resolve conflicts arising from warranty
claims.
Murthy and Blischke (1992) give a comprehensive review of the mathematical models of
warranty by classifying them into 3 categories based on consumer, manufacturer, and public
policy decision maker perspectives. In current literature a number of models have been built
to study the warranty process, such as cost accounting of warranty, warranty servicing, and
dispute resolution. In addition, a variety of mathematical models are developed to study
the effect of warranties on market behavior and the resulting social welfare implications are
examined. These fall into 4 categories based on the role assigned to warranties:
• warranties as insurance,
• warranties as signals,
• warranties as incentives,
• warranties as marketing devices.
2.1.2 Disciplines Related to Warranty
Because of this diversity of purpose, product warranty has received the attention of re-
searchers from many diverse disciplines. Blischke and Murthy (Blischke & Murthy, 1996)
review the papers written by researchers from different disciplines. These issues are inter-
linked and hence proper study of warranty requires interdisciplinary approach. The study
of warranties deals with different issues as illustrated by the following list: (Murthy &
Djamaludin, 2002)
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Legal: Court action, dispute resolution, product liability.
Economic: Market equilibrium, social welfare.
Behavioral: Buyer reaction, influence on purchase decision, perceived role of warranty, claims be-
havior.
Consumerist: Product information, consumer protection.
Engineering: Design, manufacturing, quality control, testing.
Statistics: Data acquisition and analysis, databased reliability analysis.
Operations Research: Cost modeling, optimization.
Accounting: Tracking of costs, time of accrual.
Marketing: Assessment of consumer attitudes, assessment of the marketplace, use of warranty as
a marketing tool, warranty and sales.
Management: Integration of many of the previous items, determination of warranty policy, warranty
servicing decisions.
Societal: public policy issues.
2.1.3 Express versus Implied Warranty
Warranty is a contractual theory of recovery governed by principles of sales (Kimble &
Lesher, 1979). Researchers consider both express warranties and implied warranties In mar-
keting literature. However, the vast operations management literature in warranty focuses
most on the express warranty. The difference between express and implied warranties is
explained in (Morgan, 1982)
A detailed description of express warranties can be found in Uniform Commercial Code
(Register, 1979). The key in determining the existence of an express warranty is the extent
of allowable seller puffing. General statements or affirmations that are nothing more than
15
the seller’s opinions about the product do not create an express warranty. Advertising, cat-
alog statements, besides the explicitly stated warranty contracts with purchase can be the
basis for an express warranty.
An implied warranty may exist as a matter of law even when no express warranty is stated.
An implied warranty of merchantability is part of a sales contract, unless explicitly modified
or negated, whenever the seller regularly offers the product in question for sale (Register,
1979). The implied warranty means that the item is of average quality and can be used for
the purpose for which such a product typically is used. Advertising and labels can created
certain reasonable expectations in consumer’s minds which, if not fulfilled, could lead to
breach of implied warranty.
2.1.4 Product Failure Analysis
A warranty contract specifies the expected performance and the redress available to the
user if a failure occurs. A product fails if it is unable to perform satisfactorily its intended
function when properly used. Failures are a function of several variables and these include
product reliability (influenced by design and manufacturing decisions of the manufacturer)
and the usage mode and environment (influenced by the consumer). A complete product
failure analysis over warranty period can be found in (Blischke & Murthy, 1994). The prod-
uct failures are modeled in literature either at component level or at product level in various
distributions including exponential, Weibull, gamma, lognormal and mixed exponential.
At component level, failure of each component is modeled separately according to the com-
ponent’s physical, operational characteristics and reliability. The subsequent failures of a
component may need to be modeled different from first failure of the same component de-
pending on the type of components (reparable/ non-repairable) and the type of rectification
actions (minor repair, major repair or replacement with a new or used one). According
to that, the renewal process is classified into ordinary renewal process and delayed renewal
16
process:
Ordinary Renewal Process If the product is non-repairable and replaced by a new one,
the subsequent failures are modeled as the first failure with same distribution. Or,
if the product is composed of many components and the failure is due to failure of
one (or very few) component(s) and the failed item is restored to operational state by
either repairing or replacing the failed components. (Gerner & Bryant, 1980)
Delayed Renewal Process If the product is repaired, the subsequent failures are mod-
eled with different distributions, which incorporate the factor that the repaired used
product is usually more vulnerable to failures than a new one.
Interactive Renewal Process If the failure of one component induces the failure of the
other component, the subsequent failures of both components are modeled with differ-
ent distributions. Murthy and Nguyen (1985b) developed a model for a two-component
product with interactive renewal process. They then extended it to a system with n
components (Murthy & Nguyen, 1985a).
2.1.5 Warranty Claims
The topic of warranty claims was first discussed by Gerner and Bryant (1980). They
proposed a model to examine the function of expected warranty claims with an ordinary
renewal process over product’s life cycle. Let L denote the product life cycle. This is the
period from the time the product is first introduced into the market to the instant when
it is withdrawn from the market due to the appearance of a new and better product that
replaces it. The sales rate during L increases initially and then starts decreasing over time.
Let K denote the warranty period. In the case where items are sold with non-renewing
FRW policy, the warranty claims occur over the period [0, L+K). These occur as random
points along the time axis and are a function of the reliability. For example, the first sale
of a product occurs on day 0 and its one year warranty starts immediately. We expect its
claim can possibly come in any time between day 0 and the end of year 1. If the product’s
life cycle is 5 years, which means the last product on the market is sold out on the last day
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of year 5, this product’s warranty does not expire until the end of year 6. So the interim
during which the warranty service center expects to receive claims is from day 0 to the end
of year 6, which is [0, L +K). The last Let F (t) denote distribution function for the time
to first failure and the failed item is made operational by minimal repair (Barlow & Hunter,
1960) with the failure rate just after repair being the same as that just before failure. If the
time to repair is small relative to the time between failures, then warranty claims over the
warranty period for a single item occur according to a point process with intensity function
λ(t) that is the same as the failure rate r(t) = f(t)/[1−F (t)]. Then with sales rate given by
s(t), the warranty claims occur according to a point process with intensity function given
by (Blischke & Murthy, 1996)
v(t) =
∫ t
φ
s(x)r(t− x)dx
where
φ = max0, t−K
for 0 < t < L+K. Note that v(t) is also the expected claims rate (expected claims per unit
time).The total expected warranty claims (EWC) over the life cycle is given by
EWC =
∫ K+L
0
v(t)dt.
Wasserman (Wasserman, 1992) uses a time-series approach to predict warranty claims.
2.1.6 Warranty Cost Analysis
The servicing of warranty requires service channels, repair facilities, spares, equipment
to carry our repair and replacement, which involves various service cost. A lot of research
has been done to predict failure, modeling warranty cost and analysis with time or usage
as variable. Menke (1969) and Lowerre (1968) conducted the first probabilistic analysis
of warranty cost for free replacement warranty under rebate policy. Blischke and Murthy
(1992) explore the warranty cost from an engineering point of view. Blischke and Murthy
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(1994) define several costs of interest to manufacturers and buyers:
1. Warranty cost per unit sale;
2. warranty cost over the lifetime of an item (life cycle cost LCC-I): This is buyer oriented
and includes elements such as purchase cost, maintenance and repair costs following
expiration of the warranty coverage, operating costs and disposal costs;
3. warranty cost over the product lifecycle (life cycle cost LCC-II): This is dependent on
the interval over which buyers purchase the product. This life cycle begins with the
launch of the product onto the marketplace and ends when it is withdrawn;
4. cost per unit time: This is useful for managing warranty servicing resources such as
parts inventories, labor and costs over time with dynamic sales.
2.1.7 Warranty Types and Policies
Various warranty types have been practiced and studied from the perspectives of war-
ranty design, warranty marketing, warranty servicing and warranty process management.
Blischke and Murthy (1992) proposed a taxonomy for classification of warranties. The first
criterion for classification of a warranty is whether or not the warranty requires development
after sale of the product. Policies which do not involve product development can be further
divided into two groups Group A, consisting of policies applicable for single item sales, and
Group B, policies used in the sale of groups of items (called lot or batch sales). Group C
policies involve development subsequent to the sale.
Policies in Group A can be subdivided into two sub-groups, based on whether the pol-
icy is renewing or non-renewing. In the case of one-dimensional renewing warranty policy,
the warranty gets renewed with each failure occurring within the warranty interval so that
the warranty ceases only when an item operates satisfactorily with no failures over the war-
ranty interval. In the case of two-dimensional warranties, the warranty is characterized by
a region over a two-dimensional plane with the two axes representing the age and usage
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of item. A further subdivision comes about in that warranties may be classified as simple
or combination. The free replacement (FRW) and pro-rata (PRW) are two simple poli-
cies. A combination policy is a simple policy combined with some additional features or
a policy, which combines the terms of two or more simple policies. Group C policies are
used principally in industry and government acquisition of large, complex items for example
locomotives, power plants, aircraft or military equipment. Such warranties involve several
different characteristics (some of which are reliability oriented) that change over time. One
such class of policies is the reliability improvement warranty (RIW) policies. The basic idea
of a RIW is to extend the notion of a basic consumer warranty (usually the FRW) to include
guarantees on the reliability of the item and not just on its immediate or short-term perfor-
mance. This is particularly appropriate in the purchase of complex, repairable equipment
that is intended for relatively long use. The intent of reliability improvement warranties is
to negotiate warranty terms that will motivate a manufacturer to continue improvements
in reliability after a product is delivered.Consumer durables are sold with warranty policies
from Group A as they are bought as single items. Industrial and commercial products are
sold with policies from Group A if bought individually or with policies from Group B if
bought in lots. Finally, specialised industrial and defence products built to customer re-
quirements (and often involving new and cutting edge technologies) are sold with warranty
policies belonging to Group C.
Blischke and Murthy (1992) give details of several different warranty policies belonging
to each of the three groups. A thorough review of papers on warranty policies can be found
in (Djamaludin, Murthy, & Blischke, 1996). Warranty policies that receive much research
interest are base warranty, extended warranty, lifetime warranty, warranty for used products
and service contract.
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Base and Extended Warranty
A base warranty is an integral part of a product sale and its cost is factored into the
sales price (Murthy & Jack, 2003). It is usually free of charge to consumers as assumed in
this paper. Consumers who prefer extra protection purchase additional coverage in the form
of extended warranty which is an obligation of responsibility assumed by the manufacturer
or dealer for further service to buyers beyond base warranty for a certain premium. Limited
research has been done on extended warranty. Because consumers differ in their choices of
the extended warranty some papers analyze the impact of consumer’s behavior and financial
status to their warranty preference, and then explore the best strategy to attract consumers
that value more to the manufacturer/ dealer (Padmanabhan, 1995; Lutz & Padmanabhan,
1998). Padmanabhan (1995) used utility functions to model the buyers and manufacturers
risk attitudes and discovered that heavy users of the product prefer extended warranty more
than the light users. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) proposed that high-income consumers
are more attracted to the extended warranty because they require lower marginal utility
of their wealth. Because of that the manufacturer is attempted to the moral hazard to
offer different versions of the products to different types of consumers. Higher quality and
better warranty products with higher price target high valuation high income consumers;
lower quality, lower warranty products with lower price target low income consumers. Other
research focuses on the duration and cost of extended warranty (Hollis, 1999; Mitra & Pat-
nakar, 1997; Rinsaka & Sandoh, 2001). Mitra and Patanakar (1997) analyzed the warranty
policy under which the buyer has the option to extend the warranty till the product failure
has not occurred during the base warranty period. If failure occurs during base warranty,
the consumer will receive total price refund; if it occurs during extended warranty, he will
receive a refund which is proportional to the time left in warranty. Rinsaka and Sandoh
(2001) analyzed the extension of the contract period. Yeh and Peggo (2001) proposed opti-
mal cost models for extended warranty according to two cost criteria, namely total expected
discounted cost and long-run average cost per unit time.
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Warranty for used products
Warranty is also offered with sale of second-hand products from the dealer, such as
used cars. It is estimated that in US the used cars sales was 40% of that for new cars in
numbers and 22% in values.(Genesove, 1993) Decisions related to second-hand products are
more complex compared to new products due to the fact that each second-hand product
is statistically different due to variation of age, usage and previous maintenance history.
The paper by Chattopadhyay and Murthy (1996) is the first one to set up a cost model
to analyze for a proper warranty policy for second-hand products. In another paper they
proposed stochastic models to estimate the expected warranty cost for second-hand products
(Chattopadhyay & Murthy, 2000). They then developed and analyzed stochastic models
for three new cost sharing warranty policies for second-hand products, i.e., specific parts
exclusion (SPE), limit on individual cost (LIC) and limit on individual and total cost (LITC)
(Chattopadhyay & Murthy, 2001). Under the SPE policy the components of the product
are grouped into two disjoint sets: I for inclusion and E for exclusion. Failures due to
components in set I are rectified at no cost while failures due to components in E are
rectified with costs borne by the buyer. Under LIC policy the dealer takes the cost of a
rectification is it is below a certain limit ci, otherwise the buyer pays the extra. If the
warranty policy is an LITC, similar to LIC, the cost to the dealer has an upper limit for
each rectification, however, it also has an upper limit for the total warranty servicing cost;
when the total cost exceeds the limit, the warranty terminates, and the buyer pays the
exceeded cost of that rectification.
Lifetime Warranty
With enhanced customer demand on aftermarket service and advanced technology that
ensures longer-life of durable products, manufactures start to offer lifetime warranties. Life-
time warranty means a commitment to provide repair or replacement service in case of failure
throughout the useful life of the product or the buyer’s ownership of the product (Rahman
& Chattopadhyay, 2004). Usually the warranty provider defines the termination of such
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warranty for reasons of technological obsolescence, design modifications, or even with the
change of the ownership (Rahman & Chattopadhyay, 2004). Rahman and Chattopadhyay
(2004) provided a framework of four types of product lifetime.
• Technical life/ physical life: the period over which the product lasts physically, until
replacement or major rehabilitation.
• Technological life: The period until technological obsolescence dictating replacement
due to the development of a superior alternative technology.
• Commercial life:The period over which the demand for the product exists on the
market.
• Ownership life/ social and legal life: The period until human desire or legal requirement
dictates replacement or change of ownership occurs.
Service Contract
The maintenance of some complex industry equipment, such as a production line or
a power generation turbine, requires expertise and specialized facility. Service contract
is a maintenance contract between the user and the service provider, who will carry out
maintenance actions on the user’s demand. The provider could be the manufacturer or an
independent third party. The difference between a warranty and a service contract is that
the latter is entered into voluntarily and is purchased separately the buyer may even have
a choice of terms, whereas a warranty is part of product purchase and integral to the sale.
A few research work on service contract can be found in (Ashgarizadeh & Murthy, 2000),
(Blischke & Murthy, 2000) and (Murthy & Ashgarizadeh, 1995).
2.1.8 Warranty Servicing Actions
The warranty servicing cost for a claim includes repair and/ or replacement, shipping
and handling and other administrative costs. The manufacture/ dealer chooses the most
cost efficient action, repairing or replacing with a new or used item, with considerations
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of long term costs and benefits, such as customer goodwill and future failures over the
warranty period. It is shown that costs can be reduced by conducting an inspection and
cost assessment before the service (Murthy & Nguyen, 1988). If the repair cost exceeds
a certain limit, replacement is suggested, otherwise the repair is carried out. Murthy and
Jack(2003) analyzed the cost of repairing failed item over the warranty period and proposed
that it can be minimized through optimal corrective maintenance decisions. Chukova et
al.(2004) developed a model to analyze warranty cost when imperfect repair is undertaken.
Iskander et al. (2005) suggested a new repair replacement strategy for products sold with
two-dimensional warranties.
2.1.9 Warranty Logistics
Warranty logistics deals with all the issues relating to warranty servicing. It has a signif-
icant impact on both warranty servicing cost and customer satisfaction. Murthy et al.(2004)
give a thorough review of the literature on warranty logistics and discuss potential future
research for operations researchers.
Among all the costs of interest reviewed above, the warranty servicing cost per unit time
is the most relevant from the warranty logistics perspective. This includes the costs associ-
ated with the operation of service centers (facilities and equipment) and warehouses (spare
parts inventories), the servicing of claims (material and labor for shipping and handling),
and spare part inventories. It comprises of fixed costs that are independent of claims rate
and variable costs that are dependent on the claims rate. As claims occur in an uncertain
manner and the cost of each repair is also a random variable.
As customers demand greater assurance and most countries have either enacted or are in the
process of enacting stricter legislation to protect consumer interests, proper management of
warranty logistics is becoming critical for business survival and success. To achieve this,
the manufacturer can choose to perform warranty service inhouse or outsource it to a third
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party. The ability to provide satisfactory warranty service depends on the manufacturer’s /
service delivery network that involves service facilities for spare parts storage and provide
a base for field service and a delivery system that transport returned failed items and ma-
terials needed for warranty servicing and rectified items. The realized service level of the
network is also affected by the geographical distribution of customers and by their demand
for prompt response.
The process of design and building a service network, and providing ongoing service via
the network involve several strategic and operational issues. The strategic issues are
• the number of service centers and their locations,
• the capacity and staffing level for each service center to ensure desired response time
for customer satisfaction, and
• whether to own these centers or outsource them so that the service is carried out by
independent agents.
The tactical and operational issues are
• transportation of the materials needed for warranty servicing,
• spare parts inventory management,
• scheduling of jobs, and
• optimal repair or replace decisions.
Warranty logistics: Strategic issues
As mentioned above, the main strategic issues are the location and capacity of warehouses
for stocking spares needed, service centers for carrying out product rectification, and the
channels for warranty servicing. The locations of both service centers and warehouses depend
on the geographical distribution of customers who have bought the product and the type
of product and its reliability characteristics. Another strategic decision with regard to
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warranties is whether to undertake warranty service inhouse or outsource it to an external
agent. When the channel involves an independent agent, several problems may arise for the
manufacturer, such as the monitoring of service level and contracts between parties. These
issues need to be understood and resolved properly.
Location of warehouses Warehouses are needed to stock spare parts for components
that are non-repairable and need to be replaced on failure. The number, location, capac-
ity and size of demand served by the warehouses determine the paths by which products
are directed to the marketplace. As a result, the distribution network comprises of ware-
houses, manufacturing plants and service centers as the nodes, and a transportation system
as the routes. Decisions of warehouse location need to consider all product movements and
associated costs. The objective function can be the average travel time, maximum travel
time, territory covered, total system cost or utilization of the facilities etc. Mirchandani and
Francis (1990), Dresner (1992), Daskin (1995), and Beckmann (1999) are examples of works
dealing with the location problem.
In the logistics literature, components that are non-repairable and need to be replaced
on failure are called “discardables”. Depending on the geographical area of the market, the
manufacturer might need to have a network of warehouses with a multi-echelon structure
involving one or more levels. For example, a multi-national manufacturer might have a re-
gional warehouse (level 3) receiving parts from different component manufacturers and feed-
ing to national warehouses (level 2) which feed local distributed warehouses (level 1)which,
in turn, feed parts to service centers. The location of the warehouses and the capacity of
each warehouse are determined through an analysis of the quantities of different components
that need to be stocked. This problem has received some attention in the logistic literature.
Handler and Mirchandani (1979) classify location problems based on the objective function,
the points of demand, the potential facility sites and the number of facilities to be located.
A small illustrative sample of related journal papers is as follows: Daskin and Stern (1981)
deal with location of emergency medical services, Alfredsson (1995) studies location of re-
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pair facilities, and Dasci and Verter (2001) explore location in the context of production
distribution systems. Schilling et al. (1993) explore covering models to decide on facility
location and Owen and Daskin (1998) discuss strategic facility location.
However, most models do not take into account the location of service centers and the re-
liability characteristics of the product. Future research may modify the current models to
incorporate the following issues:
• Transportation time and cost for moving parts between warehouses (in the case of
multi-echelon warehouses) and from warehouses to service centers;
• the cost of operating the warehouses;
• the capacity of each warehouse based on the demand for spares from the various service
centers that are serviced by the warehouse.
Location of service centers Many products are complex systems that can be decom-
posed into many different levels. When an item fails, the first task is to determine and
identify the most likely cause of failure. Certain products (such as an elevator in a multi-
storey building) require on-site evaluation of the failed item. For others, the failed item is
brought to either the retailer (in the case of most consumer durables) or to some designated
service center. For most products, the failed item is made operational through appropriate
actions at this level. However, in some instances, it is not possible to rectify all failures
at this level due to a lack of resources such as special equipment and/or an appropriately
trained workforce. In this case, the failed component needs to be removed and shipped
to a higher level service center for rectification. Often, there can be more than two levels
depending on the complexity of the product and the type of resources needed for rectifica-
tion. For example, in the case of a jet engine, it might involve a service facility at major
airports (level 1) followed by a national (or regional) service center (level 2) and a service
center at the manufacturing plant (level 3). This problem has received some attention in the
logistic literature and is referred to as level-of-repair analysis (LORA). This basically deals
with the task of determining whether an item is to be treated as discardable (also called
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consumable) or as repairable. If the item is to be treated as repairable, the objective is to
determine where it should be repaired in a multi-echelon repair facility. Alfredsson (1997)
deals with decisions with regard to LORA and the spare parts and test equipment needed
to support a system. Barros and Riley (2001) explores the optimization of the LORA. A
related issue is the choice of the best from a set of desirable maintenance actions, which is
discussed in Cassady et al. (2001). Fortuin and Martin (1999) have thoroughly examined
this topic. Models to determine the number of levels, the location of the service centers and
their capacities must take into account the following:
• Transportation time and cost for moving failed and repaired items between service
centers;
• the cost of operating the service centers (equipment and skilled persons needed at each
center);
• the capacity needed at each service center, depending on the demand for services at
the center;
• this in turn depends on the geographical distribution of sales, as well as product
reliability.
The location problem needs to address the following issues:
• Customers coverage (so that all customers are covered);
• distance that a failed item needs to travel;
• distance that a repairman has to travel in case of a field visit or that a customer has
to travel to bring a failed item to a service center or collection point.
Spare parts demand Besides the location and capacity decisions, the management of
inventories and the ordering policies of the spare parts warehouse also impact the service
level and total system costs. As other inventory decisions in a supply chain setting, there
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is a trade-off between the cost associated with, and the benefits derived from holding in-
ventories. To derive an optimal inventory policy, we need to model the spare parts demand
patterns.
At the highest level of warehouse, the total demand for spares of a component over the
product lifecycle can be modeled as follows. If the replacement time of a failed component
is small relative to the mean life of the component, then the demand for replacements over
the warranty period occur according to a point process with intensity function ρ(t) given by
Blischke and Murthy (1996), i.e.,
ρ(t) =
∫ t
φ
s(x)m(t− x)dx, for 0 < t < L+W,
where m(t) is the renewal density function associated with the component failure density
function g(t) and is given by
m(t) = g(t) +
∫ t
0
m(t− x)g(x)dx.
The expected replacement (or demand) rate is also given by m(t). The expected total spares
(ETS) required over the product life cycle is given by
ETS =
∫ L+W
0
ρ(t)dt.
For further discussion on spares in the context of post-sale support, see Cohen and Lee
(1990).
Service Channels In practice products are distributed through one of four main distri-
bution channels to reach customers:
1. manufacturer direct,
2. company-owned dealerships,
29
3. independent retailer and
4. some combination of the first three.
The co-ordination between the different entities has received considerable attention in the
marketing literature in the context of both supply chain and service response logistics. Works
on management of marketing channels, for example Lewis (1968) and Rosenbloom (1995),
deal with this topic in more detail. The linkage between product distribution and service
support channels is discussed in Loomba (1996).
Similar to distribution channels, a manufacturer can choose between the two following op-
tions to serve their warranty (Murthy, Solem, & Roren, 2004):
1. Service provided by the manufacturer (through retail or service centers owned and
operated by the manufacturer);
2. service provided by an independent agent.
Independent service agents Many manufacturers employ independent service agents
to carry out the warranty servicing under a properly drafted contract. Two contracts are
commonly presented in the literature:
Contract A: The manufacturer pays a lump sum to the agent and in return the agent has to
service all claims during the warranty period at no additional cost to the manufacturer.
Contract B: The service agent charges the manufacturer for each warranty service.
Several new issues arise as the interests of the manufacturer and the agent are different.
Manufacturers seek to optimize the warranty service quality to protect their reputation with
minimum payment to the agent; while the objective of the agent is to maximize its profit,
which may put customer service level under risk. Related issues that are considered in the
literature include (Murthy, Solem, & Roren, 2004):
Informational asymmetry: The manufacturer has better knowledge of product reliability
compared to the agent and similarly the agent has better information regarding field
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failures than the manufacturer. This asymmetry can lead to each party deciding on
actions that are optimal from their own individual perspective but overall sub-optimal.
Moral hazard: This situation arises when the agent shirks in the effort expended (under
Contract A) or carries out over-servicing (under Contract B) and the manufacturer is
unable to observe the service agent’s effort. In the former case, it can lead to customer
dissatisfaction and thus affecting the manufacturer’s reputation and sales.
Monitoring: The manufacturer can obtain new information by monitoring the agent’s
actions. Such information will allow the manufacturer to assess the warranty servicing
carried out by the agent. However, this results in additional effort and cost to the
manufacturer.
Adverse selection: This issue arises when the manufacturer has to choose one or more
service agents to carry out warranty servicing through a pool of service agents. The
service agents can misrepresent their ability and competencies and the manufacturer
is unable to assess them prior to the signing of the contract. This can lead to the
selection of inappropriate agents for warranty servicing.
Incentives: The manufacturer can provide proper incentives to a service agent so that the
actions of the agent are in the best interests of the manufacturer and avoid the need
for monitoring. A proper contract provides the right incentives for the service agent
to provide the optimal amount of effort.
Agency cost: The structuring, administering, and enforcing of contracts causes result in
a cost which is referred to as the agency cost.
Risks: In general, the manufacturer and the service agents have partly differing goals and
risk preferences and these impact on their individual actions.
The “agency theory” is applied to deal with the above issues. The agency theory has been
studied extensively and the literature is vast,(see for example, Eisenhardt, 1989). The study
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of warranty servicing logistics based on agency theory is a topic that has not received much
attention and offers scope for considerable new research.
Warranty logistics: Tactical and operational issues
The tactical and operational issues deal with short term activities and decisions at the
service center level. These issues include spare part inventory levels, transportation of spares
from warehouses to service centers, jobs scheduling and repair versus replacement decisions.
Spare part inventory The key issues in spare parts inventories are the following (Murthy,
Solem, & Roren, 2004):
1. Which components should be carried as spare parts?
2. What should be the inventory levels?
3. When should the spares be reordered?
4. What quantities of spares must be ordered?
These need to be linked to failures of components over time and these in turn are related to
the sales over time and component reliability.
The existent literature on inventory management is considerable. Most models dealing
with spare parts inventory assume very simple forms for the depletion of inventory. In the
warranty-servicing context, the depletion of a particular component occurs according to a
point process with the intensity function related to the dynamic sales over the region serviced
by the servicing center and the reliability of the product. Optimal decisions of inventory
levels and ordering policies need to take into account this stochastic nature of depletion.
Besides, most products are complex systems involving many components. They differ in
their usage and reliability, thus, have different failure rates. These add extra complexity to
the modeling of overall inventory policies.
32
Material transportation In supply chain raw materials and components flow from sup-
pliers to manufacturing plants and finished products flow from plants to retail markets via
a hierarchy of warehouses and retail outlets. Similarly, in warranty service logistics failed
items flow from end users to service center, spare parts flow from high level warehouse to
service centers via multi-echelon holding points, and rectified products are transported from
service centers to users.
Transportation of materials has received significant research attention in materials manage-
ment and operations management. Related more specifically to warranty servicing logistics,
one can define three kinds of material transportation as indicated below:
1. Transportation of failed units from lower level to higher level in the case of multi-
echelon service structure;
2. transportation of repaired items from service centers to customers or pick up points
where customers can collect them;
3. transportation of spares to and from warehouses.
The quantities transported are random variables related to sales, product reliability and
location’s distribution. Transportation can be carried out either by the manufacturer in-
ternally or outsourced to an independent agent. In the latter case, a contract between
the manufacturer and the independent agent needs to take into account the time and cost
of transportation, and the agreement between the parties, that specify the service quality
metrics and payment forms.
Scheduling of jobs, repairs and traveling repairman problem Warranty service
involves repairing or replacing failed items. The scheduling and execution of the trans-
portation impacts both manufacturer’s cost efficiency and customer satisfaction. The failed
item may be brought to a service center or retail outlet by the customer while the cost is
covered by the manufacturer/ dealer. Items are processed usually based on the first come
first served rule. If we consider some form of penalty resulting from delay in our model,
33
such as lower customer satisfaction or higher shipping cost through expedited shipping, the
objective function is to minimize the penalty, or some form of overall delay. If a repairman
needs to go onsite to examine and repair the failed item, such as an elevator in a building,
the scheduling of jobs is a traveling repairman’s problem. This has been discussed by Afrati,
Cosmadakis, Papadimitriou, Papageorgiou and Papakostantinou (1986), Yang (1989) and
Agnihothri (1998). The objective of job scheduling is to reduce the time spent in traveling
between jobs.
Replace versus repair strategies Whenever a repairable item fails under warranty, the
manufacturer has the option of either repairing the failed item or replacing it by a new item.
In the case of repair, the manufacturer needs to choose between different repair actions,
which impact on customer satisfaction, as well as the warranty servicing cost. Murthy et al.
(2004) reviewed some of the strategic issues of replace versus repair decisions.
Strategies based on age and usage at failure Here the decision to repair or replace
is based on the age of the item at failure (in the case of one dimensional warranties) and on
the age and/or usage (in the case of two-dimensional warranties). The optimal strategy is
selected to minimize the expected cost of servicing the warranty over the warranty period.
Blischke and Murthy (1994, 1996) discuss two sub-optimal strategies for one-dimensional
warranties and Jack and Van der Duyn Schouten (2000) deal with the optimal strategy.
Jack and Murthy (2001) examine a suboptimal policy that is very close to the optimal
strategy involving at most one replacement over the warranty period.
Cost repair limit strategy In general, the cost to repair a failed item is a random
variable, which can be characterized by a distribution functionH(t). Analogous to the notion
of a failure rate, one can define a repair cost rate given by h(z)/[1−H(z)] where h(z) is
the derivative of H(z) Depending on the form of H(z), the repair cost rate can increase,
decrease or remain constant with z. A decreasing repair cost rate is usually an appropriate
characterization of the repair cost distribution (Mahon & Bailey, 1975). Optimal repair
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limit strategies are discussed in Blischke and Murthy (1994) and Zuo et al.(2000).
Warranty logistics: Other issues
Customer satisfaction Customer dissatisfaction can arise due to poor performance
of the purchased item and/or the quality of warranty service provided by the manufacturer.
In either case, there is a negative impact on overall business performance. This could be
either due to dissatisfied customers switching to a competitor or losing potential new cus-
tomers due to negative word-of-mouth effect. The consequence of poor warranty servicing
is more difficult and costly to rectify and hence it is very important that the manufacturer
avoids this occurring in the first instance. A proper contract between the manufacturer and
service agents and the monitoring of the agent’s actions are critical for ensuring high level
customer satisfaction.
Service quality has received a lot of attention in the literature; see for example Haugen and
Hill (1999). There are several dimensions of service quality and many of these are intangible
and can vary significantly from customer to customer. Often customers can have undue ex-
pectations regarding product performance for a variety of reasons (exaggerated statements
made during promotion, customer being not fully informed etc.). However, other dimensions
are more tangible and can be objectively assessed. These include response time to attend to
a warranty claim, the time for rectifying a failed item, delays resulting from lack of spares,
workshop resources etc. Through effective warranty logistics the negative impact, resulting
from these can be minimized.
Dispute resolution Disputes in the context of warranties arise when the manufacturer
(or service agent) refuses to admit a warranty claim as a valid (or legitimate) claim for a
variety of reasons (for example, misuse of the product) or the customer is unhappy with the
warranty service provided. In either case, the problem needs to be resolved. The former is a
legal issue and has been discussed extensively in the legal literature. The latter is influenced
35
by the warranty logistics, i.e, poor warranty logistics can lead to greater number of disputes
that need to be resolved. The resolution can involve a third party (small claims tribunal for
relatively inexpensive claims or higher legal institution in the case of more costly claims).
This topic has received some attention, see, for example Steele (1975), Palfrey and Romer
(1983) and Cooter and Rubenfeld (1989).
Data collection and analysis During the servicing of warranties a lot of data is
generated. such data can be classified into different categories as indicated below.
Product related: Modes of failures, time between failures, operating environment etc.
Customer related: Satisfaction with regards to product, warranty service etc.
Servicing: Spare parts inventories, utilization of service centers, transportation of material
etc.
Economic: Costs associated with different aspects of warranty servicing.
These data need to be collected properly and analyzed to extract useful information that
can be used for improving service activities. Technical data are relevant for design changes,
servicing data are important for improving warranty logistics and, customer and financial
data are useful for improving overall business performance.
Product recall Occasionally, a manufacturer finds it necessary to recall either a frac-
tion or all of the items sold, for some rectification action as a way of reducing the overall
warranty servicing costs. The recall of only a fraction of the total production arises when
items are produced in batches and some of the batches are defective due to inferior compo-
nents or materials having been used that are not detected during quality control. A total
recall situation usually arises because of poor design specifications that can lead to malfunc-
tion under certain conditions and is discovered only after the items have been produced and
sold. In such cases, the manufacturer can be held responsible for damages caused under the
terms of warranty for fitness and the recall is to replace one or more old components by
newly designed ones.
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2.1.10 Warranty and Quality
Conventional wisdom supports the notion that better product quality means lower war-
ranty costs for the manufacturer, and lower maintenance costs for the users of a manu-
factured product. This section reviews the literature pertaining to quality measurement,
quality improvement strategies, and their impact on warranty costs.
Measuring Quality
One of the traditional measures of quality is the mean time between failures (MTBF).
However, because the mean alone provides incomplete information of the failure distribu-
tion, most reliability measures in the literature require high-order distributional measures
or the entire failure time distribution. One of them is to take the variance into account,
which makes it possible to define meaningful means of quality improvement. One way is to
increase the MTBF while keeping the variance constant. This is largely achieved by better
production inputs or operational procedures. Adoption of new manufacturing technology
upgrades, on the other hand, may impact on higher moments of the failure time distribution,
such as variance reduction.
Stochastic ordering and mixture models are used for measuring quality improvement (Sahin
& Polatoglu, 1998). The theoretical base of this work is a time-varying failure-rectification
process (which includes replacement, minimal repair, and imperfect repair) as alternative
rectification modes that may be available to the manufacturer or the user in warranty-
servicing. The use of this process enables one to investigate jointly optimal repair-effort/warranty-
policy and repair-effort/maintenance-strategy configurations for repairable units.
Quality Improvement and Warranty
Sahin and Polatoglu (1998) investigate the impact of product quality on warranty and
maintenance costs and strategies, from the perspectives of both manufacturers and users. On
general grounds, there are three ways to improve product quality: upgrading the manufac-
37
turing process, performing inspection on final products before release, or a burn-in program
to eliminate infant mortality.
The manufacturing process can be improved through higher quality inputs, superior produc-
tion equipment, and more effective process control or inspection during production. Murthy
and Nguyen (1998) link manufacturing quality with product reliability by modeling the fail-
ure time distribution of the product by F (t;ω), where ω indicates the manufacturing quality.
They develop a model to optimally select the warranty period together with product reli-
ability and price. Mamer (1987) examines the relationship between warranty and quality
control using the same representation. He determines a warranty cycle length that allows
the expected discounted cost of ownership of a sequence of products under warranty with a
random parameter to be the same as a target level of ownership cost.
Another way to improve quality is to perform outgoing inspections to weed out noncon-
forming items. These can be on the samples in the form of life testing or on every item
with nondestructive testing. Djamaludin et al. (1994) investigate life testing as a means to
prevent defective items from being released and examine the optimal testing period under
different warranty policies. Unit manufacturing cost is represented as the sum of the pro-
duction cost per item, testing cost per item (which is an increasing function of the testing
period) and the cost of scrapping a defective item. This cost is then added to the unit
warranty cost per item, the optimal testing period is derived, and its cost is compared with
the total unit cost under no inspection to determine the best policy.
The reliability of a durable product can also be improved through a burn-in program, which
has its origins in the fact that in some manufacturing processes the majority of failures occur
either right at the beginning of a product’s life or close to its end. A burn-in test is designed
to catch some of those infant stage failures and remove the faulty parts before failure. Most
maintenance strategies are based on the use of planned replacements made before failure and
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service rectifications made after failure. Planned replacements are generally less expensive
than service replacements because they are performed regularly within predetermined time
windows and involve a large number of units which result in economies of scale. The service
replacements, on the other hand, involve interruption cost for repair performance and failure
cost for user.
2.2 Literature on Supply Chain Coordination Contracts
Parties in a supply chain have full or partial access to the information needed to deter-
mine the optimal actions for the supply chain, which may maximize their own objectives
(profit for risk neutral parties, for example). However, if they do not, they may lack the
incentive to implement those actions. To create such incentives the firms can adjust their
terms of trade via a contract that establishes a transfer payment scheme. Motivated by
these challenges, a substantial amount of research has been done to explore supply chain
coordination via contracts. This section reviews the supply chain literature pertaining to
the management of incentive coordination with contracts.
As mentioned earlier, a contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the realized decisions
made by the parties in the supply chain actually optimizes the supply chain’s performance
and no party has the incentive to move away from this optimum solution under the same
circumstance. In the newsvendor model the action to coordinate is the retailer’s order quan-
tity, which in our settings, the manufacturer’s production quantity as well.
Flexibility is another issue that is worth of study. A coordinating contract is flexible if
it allows for multiple divisions of the supply chain’s profit among the parties through ad-
justing the parameters. If it is able to allocate profits arbitrarily, then there always exists
a contract that Pareto dominates a noncoordinating contract, i.e., each party’s profit is no
worse off and at least one firm is strictly better off with the coordinating contract. With any
given profit allocation, for instance, equally between manufacturer and retailer, each party
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obtains more from sharing a “bigger pie”.
Cachon(2003) provides a thorough review of supply chain contract models in the litera-
ture. A number of different contract types are identified and their benefits and drawbacks
are illustrated. The same analysis recipe is generally followed: identify the type of contracts
that can coordinate the supply chain, propose the supply chain optimal actions, determine
for each contract type the set of parameters that achieves coordination, and evaluate for
each coordinating contract type the possible range of profit allocations, i.e., what fraction of
the supply chain’s profit can be earned by each member in the supply chain with a coordi-
nating contract. Implementation issues are then explored: e.g., is a contract type compliant
with legal restrictions; what are the consequences for failing to comply with the contractual
terms; and what is a contract’s administrative burden (e.g., what types of data need to be
collected and how often must data be collected).
2.2.1 Simple Newsvendor Coordination
Under a newsvendor environment, our model considers a single manufacturer selling a
product to a single retailer. The following sequence of events occurs in this game: the man-
ufacturer offers the retailer a contract; the retailer accepts or rejects the contract; assuming
the retailer accepts the contract, it specifies an order quantity, qr, to the manufacturer;
the manufacturer produces and delivers the order to the retailer before the selling season;
season demand occurs; and finally transfer payments are made between the firms based on
the agreed upon contract. If the retailer rejects the contract, the game ends and each firm
earns a default payoff.
With a standard wholesale price only contract, it has been shown that the retailer does
not order enough inventory to maximize the supply chain’s total profit due to “double
marginalization”. Hence, coordination requires that the retailer is given an incentive to
increase its order size. Several different contract types are shown to coordinate the supply
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chain and arbitrarily divide its profit; namely buyback contracts, revenue sharing contracts,
quantity flexibility contracts, sales rebate contracts and quantity discount contracts.
2.2.2 Coordinating Contracts
Different contract models are reviewed in the light of their coordination properties in
the following sections. In general, a contract coordinates the retailer’s and the supplier’s
actions whenever each firm’s profit is an affine function of the supply chains profit, which
resembles a profit sharing arrangement. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) note profit sharing can
coordinate a supply chain, but they do not offer an influential contract for achieving profit
sharing. Caldentey and Wein (2003) show profit sharing occurs when each firm receives a
fixed fraction of every other firm’s utility.
The Wholesale Price Only Contract With a wholesale price only contract the man-
ufacturer charges the retailer W per unit purchased. Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) study
the wholesale price contract with deterministic demand. Lariviere and Porteus (2001) con-
ducted a complete analysis of this contract in the context of the newsvendor problem. They
show that only if the manufacturer charges a price less than the production cost, the whole-
sale price contract coordinates the channel. This means, the manufacturer has to earn a
non-positive profit. As a result, the wholesale price contract is generally not considered
a coordinating contract. Spengler (1950) was the first to identify the problem of “double
marginalization. The supply chain’s optimal decision is to hold inventory until the marginal
profit equals the marginal cost. The same holds for the retailer. Since the retailer’s marginal
cost is higher as long as the manufacturer charges a wholesale price higher than the produc-
tion cost, the retailer always order an amount less than the chain optimum.
The wholesale price only contract is commonly observed in practice because it is easy to
implement. The contract designer (the manufacturer or the retailer depending on their
respective power positions) may prefer the wholesale price contract over a coordinating
contract if the additional administrative burden associated with coordinating the contract
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exceeds its potential profit increase.
The contract model has been extended to multiple periods or multiple newsvendors. Cachon
(2004) studies a two period version of the model which has excess inventory and demand
updating. Dong and Rudi (2004) study the wholesale price contract with two newsvendors
and transshipment of inventory between them. They find that the manufacturer is generally
able to capture most of the benefits of transshipment and the retailers are worse off with
transshipment. This is consistent with Lariviere and Porteus (2001) finding that the man-
ufacturer is better off and the retailer worse off with less variable demand. Chod and Rudi
(2005) study a manufacturer selling a single resource to a downstream firm that can use that
resource to produce multiple products. Gilbert and Cvsa (2000) study the wholesale price
contract with demand uncertainty and costly investment to reduce production costs. They
demonstrate that a trade exists between the beneficial flexibility of allowing the wholesale
price to adjust to market demand and the need to provide incentives to reduce production
costs.
The Buyback Contract With a buy back contract the manufacturer charges the retailer
w per unit purchased, but buys back the unsold inventory from the retiler at b per unit
at the end of the season. Several motivations exist for the manufacturer to implement this
return policy (Padmanabhan & Png, 1995):
• A manufacturer may offer a return policy to prevent the retailer from discounting
left over items, thereby weakening the suppliers brand image. For instance, suppliers
of fashion apparel have large marketing budgets to enhance the popularity of their
clothes. It is difficult to convince consumers that your clothes are popular if they can
be found in the discount rack at the end of the season.
• A manufacturer may accept returns to rebalance inventory among retailers. A number
of papers consider stock rebalancing in a centralized system (see Lee, 1987, Tagaras
and Cohen 1992, and in decentralized systems (Rudi & Pyke, 2001; Anupindi, Bassok,
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& Zemel, 2001).
Pasternack (1985) conducted a detailed analysis of buy back contracts in the context
of the newsvendor problem and demonstrates that the buy back contract coordinates with
voluntary compliance and the coordination of the supply chain requires the simultaneous
adjustment of both the wholesale price and the buy-back price. This implies that in the bar-
gaining process, negotiations should always allow simultaneous changes in both the wholesale
price and the buy-back price to reach a pareto optimal decision.
There is a substantial amount of existing work on buyback contracts. Padmanabhan and
Png(1997) examines the situation where a manufacturer uses a buyback contract to manip-
ulate competition between retailers. Emmons and Gilbert (Emmons & Gilbert, 1998) study
buy back contracts with a retail price setting newsvendor. Taylor (Taylor, 2002) incorpo-
rates a buy back contract with a sales rebate contract to coordinate the newsvendor with
effort dependent demand. Donohue (Donohue, 2000) provides analysis of buy back con-
tracts in a model with multiple production opportunities and improving demand forecasts.
Anupindi and Bassok(1999) demonstrate buy back contracts can coordinate a two-retailer
supply chain in which consumers search among the retailers to identify available inventory.
Lee, Padmanabhan, Taylor and Wang(2000) model price protection policies in a way that
closely resembles a buyback policy.
The Revenue Sharing Contract With a revenue sharing contract the manufacturer
charges Wr per unit purchased plus a percentage of retailer’s revenue. Let φ be the fraction
of supply chain revenue kept by the retailer, i.e..,(1 − φ) is the fraction of revenue that
the manufacturer earns. Revenue sharing contracts have been applied in the video cassette
rental industry with fully success. Cachon and Lariviere(2005) provide an analysis of these
contracts in a more general setting and demonstrate that revenue sharing contracts coordi-
nate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate its profit to the two parties. Mortimer(2006)
provides a detailed econometric study of the impact of revenue sharing contracts in the video
rental industry. He found that the adoption of these contracts increased total supply chain
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profits by about seven percent. Dana and Spier(2001) study these contracts in the context
of a perfectly competitive retail market. Consistent with Mortimer(2006), they find that
revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition with-
out distorting retailers’ inventory decisions. Gerchak, Cho and Ray (2006) consider a video
retailer that determines the number of tapes to purchase and time to keep them. Revenue
sharing coordinates their supply chain, but provides a unique division of profit. They, thus,
propose a licensing fee as an additional lever.
The Quantity Flexibility Contract With a quantity flexibility contract the manufac-
turer charges Wq per unit purchased but then compensates the retailer for its losses on
unsold units up to a threshold. To be specific, the retailer receives a credit from the manu-
facturer at the end of the season equal to (Wq+cr−v)min(I, δq) where cr is the retailer’s per
unit procurement cost, v is the salvage value, I is the amount of left over inventory, q is the
number of units purchased and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is a contract parameter. Thus, quantity flexibility
contract fully protects the retailer on a portion of its order, whereas the buyback contract
provides only partial protection on the retailer’s entire order. If the manufacturer does not
compensate the retailer for the procurement cost then the retailer would receive only partial
compensation on a limited number of units, which is called a backup agreement. Those
contracts are studied by Pasternack (1985), Eppen and Iyer (1997) and Barnes-Schuster,
Bassok and Anupindi (2002). It has been found that quantity flexibility contracts coordi-
nate the supply chain only with forced compliance, whereas the manufacturer has to deliver
the order amount; otherwise it has incentives to deliver less than the order.
Tsay (1999) studies supply chain coordination with quantity flexibility contracts where the
retailer receives an imperfect demand signal before submitting its order. Nevertheless, since
production is completed before actual demand information is available, the centralized solu-
tion in Tsay(1999) is the same as the above newsvendor problem. The demand signal does
not change the analysis or the outcome if the retailer returns units only at the end of the
season: by then the demand signal is no longer relevant. However, if the retailer is able
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to return units after observing the demand signal and before the selling season starts, then
this signal does matter. Because the inventory that is produced is sunk, the supply chain
optimal solution is to keep all inventory at the retailer regardless of the signal received.
Allowing the retailer to return inventory (alternatively, allowing the retailer to cancel a por-
tion of the initial order) creates a stranded inventory problem. In other words, inventory
can be stranded at the manufacturer’s, and is not available for satisfying demand. In such
a situation, as shown in Tsay (1999), a quantity flexibility contract may actually prevent
supply chain coordination.
Other papers that study the quantity flexibility contract, or a closely related contract in-
clude Tsay and Lovejoy(1999), Bassok and Anupindi(1997), Cachon and Lariviere(2001).
Tsay and Lovejoy (1999) study quantity flexibility contracts for multiple locations, multiple
demand periods with lead time and demand forecast updates. Bassok and Anupindi(1997)
propose a rolling horizon flexibility contract and provide an in-depth analysis for a single
stage system with more general assumptions than Tsay and Lovejoy(1999). In multiple pe-
riod models it is observed that these contracts dampen supply chain order variability, which
is a potentially beneficial feature that the single period model does not capture.
The Sales Rebate Contracts With a sales rebate contract the manufacturer charges
Ws per unit purchased but then gives the retailer a rebate for r per unit (called markdown
allowance) sold above a threshold t. With these three parameters, a sales rebate contract
has more than sufficient parameters to coordinate the supply chain and allocate profit ar-
bitrarily between the parties. It is observed that there is generally a set of contracts that
generate any profit allocation.
There are several papers that study this type of contracts or those closely related to it,
such as Taylor(2002) and Krishnan et al.(2004), where the latter refers to the rebate as a
“markdown allowance. Both papers allow the retailer to exert effort for increasing demand.
In Taylor’s paper(2002), the effort is chosen simultaneously with the order quantity, whereas
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in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) the retailer chooses an order quantity, a signal
of demand is observed and then the effort is exerted. In this case, if the demand signal is
strong relative to the order quantity, the retailer chooses not to exert much effort.
The Quantity Discount Contract There are many types of quantity discounts. This
section considers an “all unit quantity discount, i.e., the transfer payment is Td(q) =Wd(q)q.
Wd(q) is the per unit wholesale price that is decreasing in order amount q. As with other
coordinating contracts, the quantity discount contract achieves coordination by manipulat-
ing the retailer’s marginal cost curve, while leaving the retailers marginal revenue curve
untouched. Coordination is achieved if the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves in-
tersect at the optimal quantity. Hence, there is an infinite number of marginal cost curves
that intersect the marginal revenue curve at a single point (Cachon, 2003) and, thus, many
coordinating quantity discount schedules exist (Moorthy, 1987). Kolay et al.(2004) provide
a discussion on different types of quantity discounts. Wilson (Wilson, 1993) gives a much
broader discussion on non-linear pricing.
2.2.3 Compliance Regime
It is assumed that the manufacturer cannot force the retailer to accept more product
than it orders, but it is debatable whether the manufacturer is required to deliver the re-
tailer’s entire order. This influences the types of contracts that coordinate the supply chain,
i.e., some contracts coordinate with one compliance regime, but not with another.
Under voluntary compliance, the manufacturer delivers the amount (not to exceed the retail-
ers order) that maximizes its profit given the terms of the contract. Voluntary compliance
increases the robustness of the supply chain. For example, if the manufacturer offers gener-
ous buyback terms to the retailer, the manufacturer does not want the retailer to order too
much product. In case the retailer is not rational and orders more than the chain optimal
quantity (q > qo), under voluntary compliance the manufacturer can avoid this excessive
ordering error by shipping only qo. See Chen(1999) and Porteus(2000) for further discussion
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on the robustness of a coordination scheme to irrational ordering.
With voluntary compliance, however, the manufacturer may ship less than the retailer’s
order even if all parties are quite rational. For a fixed wholesale price, which is no less than
the production cost, the supplier’s profit is non-decreasing in the order amount, so that
the manufacturer produces and delivers whatever quantity the retailer orders. The buyback
contract coordinates with voluntary compliance. Revenue sharing and quantity discounts
always coordinate the manufacturer’s action with voluntary compliance, quantity flexibility
contracts generally coordinate the supplier’s action, whereas sales rebate contracts never do.
Alternatively, the retailer may believe the manufacturer will never deliver less than the
order, because the consequences for doing so are sufficiently deleterious, e.g., court action or
a loss of reputation. This is called a forced compliance regime. With forced compliance the
manufacturer bears the full risk of an irrational retailer, a risk that even a risk neutral man-
ufacturer may choose to avoid. Cachon and Lariviere(2001) outline an additional discussion
on compliance regimes, where they check under each contract type if the manufacturer has
any incentive to deliver less than the entire order.
2.2.4 Administration Cost
The various coordinating contracts discussed above may not be equally costly to admin-
ister. A wholesale price only contract is easy to describe and requires a single transaction
between the firms. The quantity discount also requires only a single transaction, but it is
more complex to describe. The other coordinating contracts are more costly to administer:
the manufacturer must monitor the number of units the retailer has left at the end of the
season, or the remaining units must be transported back to the manufacturer, depending on
where the units are salvaged. A contract designer may prefer a non-coordinating contract
if it is “highly efficient” (explained below) and easy to administer.
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2.2.5 Efficiency of Non-coordinating Contracts
The three performance measures to a non-coordinating contract are the efficiency of the
contract defined as the realized chain profit over optimal profit Π(qreal)/Π(q∗), the suppliers
profit share over realized profit and the retailer’s profit share over realized profit. From the
supplier’s perspective, the wholesale price contract is an attractive option if both of those
measures are high: the product of these ratios is the supplier’s share of the supply chain’s
optimal profit.
2.2.6 Independence of Contract Parameters
The independence of a contract to some parameter is also advantageous if the manu-
facturer lacks information regarding this parameter. For example, a manufacturer does not
need to know a retailer’s demand distribution to coordinate the supply chain with a revenue
sharing contract, but would need to know the retailer’s demand distribution with a quantity
flexibility, sales rebate or quantity-discount contract.
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3. Supply Chain Optimization
3.1 Introduction
Research in Supply Chain Management has grown dramatically in the past decade as
firms have intensified efforts to streamline operations for higher efficiency. Central to this
theme is the need to coordinate with the upstream suppliers and downstream retailers to
ensure that the supply chain is both efficient and responsive to dynamic market needs.
These coordination opportunities introduce new challenges and complexities, because differ-
ent players have potentially conflicting incentives. Each party is primarily concerned with
optimizing its own objectives which may sacrifice the chain’s overall performance. However,
optimal performance is achievable if the parties coordinate on a contract which aligns their
objectives with the chain’s through a proper profit allocation. Over the last decade the issue
of supply chain coordination through contracting has attracted many researchers and the
literature is vast.
A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if the set of supply chain optimal ac-
tions is adopted while each party optimizes its own objective. The most studied issue is
to coordinate the retailer’s order quantity (which in turn determines the manufacturer’s
production quantity) with the supply chain’s optimum. A number of different supply chain
coordinating contract types are identified. It is shown that in a simple newsvendor prob-
lem, buy back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), revenue sharing contracts (Cachon & Lariviere,
2005), quantity flexibility contracts (Tsay, 1999), sales rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002; Kr-
ishnan, Kapuscinski, & Butz, 2004) and quantity discount contracts (Moorthy, 1987) can
coordinate the production quantity of a supply chain. The related compliance regime (Chen,
1999; Porteus, 2000; Cachon & Lariviere, 2001) and administration cost is also discussed.
Despite the vast literature, none of the existing research considers the problem with the
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presence of manufacture’s warranty decision. How does a manufacture’s warranty affect the
supply chain’s optimal inventory and its retailer’s order quantity?
Motivated by this challenge, this thesis focuses on the supply chain coordination by con-
tracts with consideration of free replacement manufacture warranty (FRW hereafter).
As a common practice in industry, warranty has received the attention of researchers from
many diverse disciplines. Menke (Menke, 1969) and Lowerre (Lowerre, 1968) conducted
the first probabilistic analysis of warranty cost for free replacement warranty under rebate
policy. After that, warranty has been researched in legal, economic, behavioral, market-
ing and management science to examine its operations and impacts in various aspects. A
comprehensive review of warranty research in different disciplines can be found in “Product
Warranty Handbook” (Blischke & Murthy, 1996).
A lot of research has been done to discuss various aspects of warranty. However, it is
rare to see discussions in supply chain coordination. What is the optimal warranty strategy
for a supply chain? Does the warranty designer (the manufacturer in this paper) have suf-
ficient incentive to adopt the supply chain optimal warranty strategy?
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the above questions. We consider a single period
newsvendor model in a two echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer.
The manufacturer offers FRW to the end customers, who react positively to warranty of-
fering. The manufacturer decides the warranty length to maximize its profit while retailer
decides order quantity, which determines the manufacturer’s production level, to maximize
its own. The chain is coordinated if their decisions are supply chain’s optimal production
level and warranty length. It is found that simple wholesale price only contract between
them does not coordinate production or warranty. Only if both revenue and warranty costs
are shared, with contract parameters satisfying some conditions, the supply chain is co-
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ordinated in both aspects. At coordination, the supply chain enjoys a full freedom profit
allocation. That is, we are able to allocate each party a profit share from 0% to 100% by
changing contract parameters.
3.2 The Free Replacement Warranty
We consider FRW for inexpensive small electronic appliances such as printers and wash-
ers. With its relatively low production cost, it is more cost efficient to replace the product
instead of repairing it. If a product fails during warranty K, the consumer files a warranty
claim to the manufacturer/ manufacturer. Here we adopt the common assumption that
time before product failure follows an exponential distribution with mean 1β . Thus for any
purchase the probability of a replacement during warranty is 1 − e−βK . We assume the
product enjoys good quality and warranty time is reasonably short, so the probability of
two or more failures during warranty is extremely low and can be ignored. When a warranty
claim arrives, it incurs warranty servicing cost to the manufacturer. A detailed warranty
cost analysis from manufacturer’s and consumer’s point can be found in “Warranty Cost
Analysis” (Blischke & Murthy, 1994). Here we consider the common cost structure that
includes unit production cost for replacement unit, shipping and handling cost, customer
service cost, administrative cost and goodwill lost. If the warranty policy requires the defec-
tive product to be returned, the returned units provide components for future production.
The final service cost per claim varies upon products and warranty policies. In this research
we assume a constant average warranty servicing cost per claim r, which in practice can be
estimated from the total cost of warranty and the number of claims per year.
The expected per unit warranty cost for each unit sale is therefore the replacement cost
r times the probability that the sold unit fails during warranty time K. Demand D is
considered to be stochastic with its cumulative distribution as F (·). We incorporate the
warranty’s positive influence on demand by assuming ∂F (·|K)∂K < 0. Specifically, we assume
the mean of demand distribution becomes larger with larger K, while its variance remains
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constant.
3.3 Total Supply Chain Function
We follow the standard newsvendor model assumptions that the production and sales
are solely for one season; the leftover products are salvaged at the end of the season. Let Q
be the retailer’s order quantity, which is also the manufacturer’s production quantity as the
manufacturer serves only one retailer. The supply chain obtains expected revenue from ex-
pected regular sales S(Q,K) with product unit price p and season end salvage sales I(Q,K)
with salvage price at v. Its profit is revenue minus total cost, which includes per unit cost
c that consists of manufacturer’s production cost cs and retailer’s procurement cost cr; per
unit lost sales cost g that consists of manufacturer’s lost sales cost gs and retailer’s lost sales
cost gr; and per unit warranty service cost r. We assume r > p− c as the supply chain does
not make a profit from a product that fails during warranty; and c = cs + cr > v as it does
not profit from units salvaged. Neither the retailer nor the manufacturer is able to profit
from defective products that fail in warranty period, or salvaged inventories. Therefore it is
assumed that under whole sale only contract r > p− cr−W for the retailer and r > W − cs
for the manufacturer; under revenue sharing contract r > φp− cr −W for the retailer and
r > (1−φ)p−cs+W for the manufacturer, where φ is the retailer’s revenue share stipulated
in the contract.
Let µ(K) denote the expected demand given warranty length K. It is shown that
µ(K) =
∫∞
0
(1− F (D|K))dD
Let S(Q,K) represent expected sales for the given Q and K. It can be expressed as
S(Q,K) = E [min(Q,D)]
= Q− ∫ Q
0
F (D|K)dD.
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Let I(Q,K) represent expected leftover inventory, then
I(Q,K) =
∫ Q
0
F (D|K)dD
= Q− S(Q,K).
Let L(Q,K) represent expected lost sales. It is expressed as
L(Q,K) = µ−Q+ ∫ Q
0
F (D|K)dD
= µ(K)− S(Q,K).
The probability that a product fails during warranty is
P (Y ≤ K) = 1− e−βK .
The expected number of warranty claims for the sale amount S(Q,K) is
E [N ] = P (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K).
Let Π be the supply chain’s expected profit. No matter what contract is adopted the chain’s
profit is
Π(Q,K) = [p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K)]S(Q,K)− (c− v)Q− gµ(K). (3.3.1)
The following events occur in the decision process:
• The manufacturer decides the warranty period K.
• We assume the manufacturer dominates the relationship and determines the contract
parameters. He determines the wholesale price W and/or revenue share φ and/or
warranty cost share θ, and offers the contract to the retailer. At the same time, he
informs the retailer the warranty policy.
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• The retailer decides whether to accept or reject the contract. He will accept it as long
as his expected profit is positive.
• If the retailer accepts the offer, he decides the order amount Q based on the demand
forecast given K.
• The manufacturer delivers Q units of products to the retailer before the selling season.
• The selling season starts and the demand is realized.
• Warranty claims are filed and warranty service is fulfilled by the manufacturer.
• The warranty period expires, and full transfer payments are made between the parties
according to the contract.
For any set of cost parameters and warranty time K the supply chain profit function is
concave in order quantity Q,
∂2Π
∂Q2 = (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂
2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K))
< 0.
(3.3.2)
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition to optimize the supply chain’s profit with
respect to Q is
∂Π
∂Q
= (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
− (c− v) = 0.
The optimal order quantity for the supply chain is then always
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|K) = c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) . (3.3.3)
We need the expected warranty servicing cost per unit sale relatively small that
rP (Y ≤ K) < p+ g − v
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for the supply chain to earn a positive profit. This is realized either through low servicing
cost per claim r or high product quality (small P (Y ≤ K)).
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4. Wholesale Contract
In the absence of warranty costs considered in the supply chain it is generally known
that due to the double marginalization the wholesale contract coordinates the supply chain
if and only if the manufacturer earns a non-positive profit.(Lariviere & Porteus, 2001) Our
analysis shows that with the existence of warranty the result is also not improved with or
without warranty cost sharing.
4.1 Wholesale without Warranty Cost Sharing
For a wholesale contract without warranty cost sharing, the manufacturer takes all the
warranty cost. The manufacturer determines the warranty length and quotes a wholesale
price, the retailer then determines the order quantity. The decision making process can be
described as:
• Given K and W the retailer chooses order quantity Q to maximize its profit knowing
that the demand follows a distribution with cdf as F (D|K).
• Knowing that the retailer will choose its optimal Q∗ corresponding to the wholesale
price and warranty length, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price W .
• The manufacturer decides warranty length K to maximize its profit.
The manufacturer’s expected profit Πs is
Πs(W,K;Q∗) = WQ− csQ− gsL(Q,K)− rE[n]
= (W − cs)Q+ (gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− gsµ(K).
(4.1.1)
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The retailer’s expected profit Πr is
Πr(q;W,K) = pS(Q,K) + vI(Q,K)−WQ− grL(Q,K)− crq
= pS(Q,K) + v [Q− S(Q,K)]−WQ− gr [µ(K)− S(Q,K)]− crq
= (p− v + gr)S(Q,K)− (W + cr − v)Q− grµ(K).
(4.1.2)
The objective of the supply chain is to maximize its expected profit:
max
Q,K
Π(Q,K)
The retailer chooses order quantity Q to maximize its expected profit:
max
Q
Πr(Q;W,K).
The manufacturer’s optimization problem is
max
w,K
Πs(W,K;Q∗).
Whether there exists one or more (W,K, q) to coordinate the supply chain depends on
whether the above profit functions can be maximized simultaneously.
Lemma 4.1.1. For any given warranty time K, when the manufacturer incurs all of the
warranty cost the supply chain cannot be coordinated by choosing an appropriate wholesale
price W .
The proof is shown in the appendix. It shows that the manufacturer should choose
W =
(p− v + gr)(c− v)
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) − (cr − v)
to coordinate the supply chain. This is impossible because the manufacturer then earns
a negative profit. Practically, the wholesale contract with the manufacturer taking all the
warranty cost does not coordinate the supply chain.
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4.2 Wholesale with Warranty Cost Sharing
As demand is increasing with longer warranty and retailer also benefits from greater
demand, for the contract to better reflect this benefit sharing the retailer should take part
of the warranty cost. In this section we consider the retailer takes a percentage of θ of
warranty cost. The rest is on the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s expected profit is thus
Πs(W,K;Q∗) = (gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− (cs −W )Q− gsµ(K). (4.2.1)
The retailer’s expected profit is
Πr(W, q,K) = (p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− (W + cr − v)Q− grµ(K). (4.2.2)
Lemma 4.2.1. For given warranty time K the whole sale contract with warranty cost shar-
ing does not coordinate the order quantity by choosing an appropriate wholesale price W and
warranty cost share θ.
The proof is shown in the appendix.
Because the marginal profit of the retailer is less than that of the chain at the same Q,the
retailer stops ordering before reaching the channel’s optimal order quantity. This is called
double marginalization, which is first identified by Spengler (Spengler, 1950). The consid-
eration of warranty cost, whether shared or not, does not help to synchronize the marginal
profits of both parties and the supply chain,and thus, does not coordinate the order quantity.
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5. Revenue Sharing
Revenue sharing has been known as a coordinating contract in the ordinary news vendor
model. It has been applied in the video rental industry with much success. (Cachon &
Lariviere, 2005) Blockbuster’s market share has increased from 24% in 1997 to 40% in 2002
(Warren & Peers, 2002). A detailed econometric study of the impact of revenue sharing
contracts in the video rental industry is conducted by Mortimer (2002). it finds that the
adoption of these contracts increased the supply chain profits by seven percent.
With full freedom to choose the revenue share φ and wholesale price W revenue sharing
contract coordinates the supply chain and arbitrarily allocates the profit. Cachon and Lar-
iviere (2005) provide an analysis of these contracts in a general setting. Pasternack (2005)
presents a single retailer newsvendor model in which the retailer can purchase some units
with revenue sharing and other units with a wholesale price contract. Cachon (2003) points
out that with price dependent demand revenue sharing is able to coordinate the retailer’s
quantity and retail price automatically with the same set of contracts used when the retailer
price is fixed.
In this section we present two models: revenue sharing contract with warranty cost on
manufacturer and revenue sharing contract with warranty cost sharing. The process to
determine the contract parameters is similar to the wholesale but the manufacturer also
chooses the optimal revenue share φ at the same time of the wholesale price W . We find
that supply chain coordination can be achieved only when the warranty cost is shared.
5.1 Revenue Sharing with Manufacturer Taking All Warranty Cost
Assume the contract dictates revenue sharing in both regular price sales and salvage
revenues. The retailer takes the share of φ of the total revenue including regular sale and
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salvage and the manufacturer takes the rest. As salvage in reality usually implies a loss we
assume again c > v and w + cr > φ. That is, the retailer does not gain any profit from any
unit salvaged. The transfer payment to the manufacturer in a revenue sharing contract is
Tr(W, q, φ) = (W + (1− φ)v)q + (1− φ)(p− v)S(Q). (5.1.1)
The manufacturer provides the replacement service for defect products and bear all the
costs from warranty. The fact that it is not able to profit from a defect product motivates
its quality control and improvement. We model this by assuming r > p(1 − φ) − cs +W .
His expected profit function is
Πs(W, q,K) = Tr(W, q, φ)− csQ− gsL(Q,K)− rE[n]
= ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− ((cs −W )− (1− φ)v)q − gsµ(K).
(5.1.2)
The retailer’s expected profit is
Πr(W, q,K) = pφS(Q,K) + vφI(Q,K)−WQ− grL(Q,K)− crq
= ((p− v)φ+ gr)S(Q,K)− (W + cr − vφ)Q− grµ(K)
.
(5.1.3)
Lemma 5.1.1. Given any specific K and the manufacturer pays all the warranty cost, rev-
enue sharing contract coordinates the supply chain order quantity if the contract parameters
satisfy
φ(p− v) + gr
p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K) =
W + cr − vφ
c− v . (5.1.4)
The coordinating order quantity Q∗ satisfies
1− F (Q∗|K) = c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) .
The proof is shown in appendix.
If we define this ratio φ(p−v)+grp+g−v−rP (Y≤K) = λ, at coordination the retailer’s profit is (Π +
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gµ(K))λ − grµ(K); the manufacturer’s profit is (Π + gµ(K))(1 − λ) − gsµ(K). This ratio
λ is the profit allocation parameter and varying it results in different profit share. When
λ = grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) , the manufacturer obtains whole chain’s profit and the retailer earns zero dollar;
when λ = Π+grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) the retailer obtains whole chain’s profit. For a feasible profit allocation
that both parties get non-negative profit, λ needs to be in the range ( grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) ,
Π+grµ(K)
Π+gµ(K) ),
i.e., the contract parameters need to satisfy grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) <
φ(p−v)+gr
p+g−v−rP (Y≤K) =
W+cr−vφ
c−v <
Π+grµ(K)
Π+gµ(K) . within the above range the ratio, and hence the profit allocation depends on
the negotiation between the parties.In the special case when there is no lost sales cost, i.e.,
gr = gs = 0, λ exactly equals the retailer’s final share of profit, and can be any value between
zero and one.
This conclusion is consistent with the simple revenue sharing model without warranty. Our
model shows that when warranty is considered and taken all by the manufacturer, after
the warranty time K has been determined as long as the manufacturer chooses the con-
tract parameters from the above coordinating parameters set the retailer will automatically
choose the supply chain first best order quantity. With the freedom of choosing two contract
parameters the manufacturer can arbitrarily allocate the supply chain’s profit between two
parties. Each party’s profit can be allocated at any value between zero to the whole chain’s
profit.
Lemma 5.1.2. The coordinating Q∗ also maximizes the manufacturer’s profit given K and
other contract parameters, so the manufacturer will voluntarily comply with the retailer’s
order quantity.
Since the retailer’s order quantity will also maximizes the manufacturer’s profit, the man-
ufacturer will comply and deliver the exact amount as ordered. If in case the retailer orders
the wrong amount, the manufacturer has the incentive to correct it to the chain optimal
quantity. This is what we call “double optimization” system.
As another endogenous parameter in the contract, the warranty time K should then be
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determined by the manufacturer to optimize the supply chain. There exists an optimal K∗
to coordinate the supply chain if and only if it is optimal for both the manufacturer and the
supply chain, and it coordinates the supply chain with 5.1.4 satisfied.
Note from 3.3.2 that Π(Q,K) is concave in Q for any given K. From 5.1.4 we see there
is a unique optimal Q for each K, while the integrated channel profit function may not be
concave or unimodal in K. We employ the method in (Petruzzi & Dada, 1999). Assume
there exists a finite but may not unique optimal quantity-warranty pair, Q∗,K∗. Let K∗(q)
be the supply chain optimal warranty time for a given Q. There might be multiple K∗(q)
for any given Q. But all of them must satisfy the necessary but not sufficient first order
condition of the supply chain
∂Π
∂K = −rS(Q,K)∂P (Y≤K)∂K + (p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)∂K − g ∂µ(K)∂K
= 0.
(5.1.5)
Because the manufacturer determines the warranty period, a coordinatingK should optimize
the manufacturer’s and the channel integrated profit simultaneously. A contract fails to
coordinate if it is unable to satisfy the supply chain’s and the manufacturer’s first order
conditions at the same K∗(q) or it is able to satisfy the first order conditions at K∗(q) only
with parameters that fail to coordinate the quantity decision. From this we derive lemma
5.1.3.
Lemma 5.1.3. If the profit functions are concave in (Q,K) and
grµ(K∗)
Π + gµ(K∗)
<
gr
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) ·
∂µ(K)
∂K |K∗
∂S(Q,K)
∂K |K∗
<
Π+ grµ(K∗)
Π + gµ(K∗)
,
revenue sharing contract without warranty cost sharing coordinate the supply chain with the
allocation parameter
λ∗ =
gr
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) ·
∂µ(K)
∂K |K∗
∂S(Q,K)
∂K |K∗
.
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The proof is shown in the appendix. In the revenue sharing without warranty cost
sharing contract the retailer pays no marginal cost of warranty while enjoys a share of λ of
the marginal revenue that longer warranty brings.The manufacturer, on the other hand, pays
the whole marginal cost of providing longer warranty as the supply chain while enjoys only
a share (1− λ) of the marginal revenue that the warranty brings. Unless the manufacturer
gets some marginal compensation somewhere else, it usually earns less marginal profit than
the supply chain and chooses a shorter warranty period than the chain optimal. Lemma
5.1.3 shows that there is only one instance that the manufacturer chooses the supply chain
optimal warranty period, and the realized profit is allocated in a specific way. This result
may not be of much help in practice, as the profit allocation in a chain depends on the
negotiation power of the members, and may not coincide with above allocation.
5.2 Revenue and Warranty Sharing Contract
Let θ be the warranty cost share that the retailer pays and the rest of 1 − θ is paid by
the manufacturer.
The retailer’s profit function is
Πr = [(p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr]S(Q,K)− (W + cr − vφ)Q− grµ(K). (5.2.1)
The manufacturer provides the replacement service for defective products and bear a
proportion of 1 − θ of the total costs from warranty. His earning from a defective product
is not able to cover its share of the product’s replacement cost, which gives him strong
incentive to control defect rate. This is modeled by defining (1− θ)r > p(1− φ)− cs +W .
The manufacturer’s profit function is
Πs = [(p− v)(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) + gs]S(Q,K)− (cs −Ws − v(1− φ))Q− gsµ(K).
(5.2.2)
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We first consider whether the quantity decision can be coordinated for a given K. By taking
the first orders of the profit functions we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2.1. Given any given K, the revenue and warranty sharing contract coordinates
the supply chain if the contract parameters satisfy
φ(p− v) + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K)
p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K) =
W + cr − vφ
c− v . (5.2.3)
The coordinating order quantity Q satisfies
1− F (Q|K) = c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) .
As the conclusion of lemma 5.1.1, if we define the ratio φ(p−v)+gr−θrP (Y≤K)p+g−v−rP (Y≤K) = λ, λ is
the profit allocation parameter. With grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) < λ <
Π+grµ(K)
Π+gµ(K) , the retailer’s profit ranges
from 0% to 100% of the supply chain’s. Thus there always exists a contract that Pareto
dominates a non-coordinating contract, i.e., each firm’s profit is no worse off and at least
one firm is strictly better off with the coordinating contract.
Because the retailer also shares the burden of warranty cost intuitively the warranty time
is possibly determined by the joint decision of both parties. Hereby we first consider the
simultaneous optimization of the manufacturer and the integrated chain and then we check
whether the retailer will comply the contract voluntarily or object to it.
If it is a coordinating contract that can allocate revenues arbitrarily then there always
exists a contract that Pareto dominates a non-coordinating contract, i.e., each firm’s profit
is no worse off and at least one firm is strictly better off with the coordinating contract.
We derive the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2.2. If the integrated channel’s profit function is concave in K, the revenue and
warranty sharing contract coordinates the supply chain with K∗ and θ∗ = λ, where K∗
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satisfies
(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂K
− rS(Q,K)∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
− g ∂µ(K)
∂K
= 0; (5.2.4)
and λ satisfies 5.2.3.
The proof is shown in appendix.
Lemma 5.2.2 shows that as long as the chain profit function is concave the revenue and
warranty sharing contract coordinates the chain and arbitrarily allocates the profit. The
allocation is explicitly defined by their warranty cost shares. This freedom of profit alloca-
tion is made possible by the ample numbers of contract parameters: W , φ and θ. Basically
with three parameters the revenue and warranty sharing contract is able to make the man-
ufacturer’s (and thus the retailer’s) marginal profit with respect to K an affine function of
the integrated chain’s marginal profit, which induce the manufacturer’s warranty decision
coincides with the integrated channel’s. One special case is when φ = θ = grg . That is, if
the manufacturer and retailer agrees on the same percentage share of revenue and warranty
expense, this percentage should coincide with the respective percentage of the unit shortage
cost.
Theorem 5.2.3. The revenue and warranty sharing contract coordinates the supply chain
as long as
w + cr − φp− gr = θ(c− p− g) (5.2.5)
A special attribute of the contract is that the coordination does not depend on the quality
level (reflected by failure rate) or demand distribution. That means, if the manufacturing
process or inspection procedure is improved, or new technology is adopted, so that the failure
rate is decreased, the equilibrium still holds. There is no need to redesign the parameters
of the contract to coordinate two parties. However, the optimal warranty length might be
different and the retailer may be willing to take more inventory risk because he expects to
pay less warranty cost. These result in larger order quantities, and thus higher overall sales
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and profits for both parties.
66
6. Fair Profit Share at Coordination
Our theorem shows that the revenue and warranty sharing contract coordinates the
supply chain as long as θ = λ. At coordination the retailer and manufacture’s profit shares
are respectively
Πr = θΠ+ θgµ(K)− grµ(K),
Πs = (1− θ)Π− θgµ(K) + grµ(K).
θ is the retailer’s share of warranty cost.
By determining θ, we can arbitrarily allocate profits among two parties and the alloca-
tion is explicitly defined by their warranty cost share. This is a unique property of revenue
and warranty sharing contract; it allocates profit with full freedom. This raises another
interesting question: can we recommend a fair profit allocation?
As suggested by Banerjee and Kim (1995), we might consider a fair and equitable manner
of sharing benefit from coordination as sharing profit by the relevant cost / capital invested
by each party. In our model the relevant cost of retailer RCr and cost of manufacturer RCs
are respectively
RCr = θrP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + crQ+WQ+ gr[µ(K)− S(Q,K)],
RCs = (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + csQ+ gs[µ(K)− S(Q,K)].
We seek a fair manner to share the supply chain profit by the relevant costs: Πr/Πs =
RCr/RCs.
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6.1 Special Case
If the supply chain lost sales cost g is so small that it can be ignored in the total cost,
the cost functions of the two parties are
RCr = θrP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + crQ+WQ,
RCs = (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + csQ.
and their profits at coordination are
Πr = θΠ,
Πs = (1− θ)Π.
θ exactly allocates the profit.
If we define θ as
θ/(1− θ) = (cr +W )/cs,
the profit is then allocated in the same manner as cost
Πr
ΠS
=
θ
1− θ =
cr +W
cs
=
RCr
RCs
.
This provides an easy and explicit way to implement the fair and equitable profit allocation.
As long as the contract states the allocation of warranty cost in the same manner as retailer’s
total procuring cost to manufacture’s production cost, the final profit will automatically be
allocated according to each party’s relevant cost.
6.2 General Case
Generally we consider lost sales cost is not ignorable. It mainly consists of lost profit. If
we assume the unit lost sale cost is the average unit profit,
gr = Πr/Q,
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gs = Πs/Q,
and the supply chain lost sale cost is
g = Π/Q;
the retailer’s profit is therefore
Πr = θ(Π + Πµ(K)/Q)−Πrµ(K)/Q.
That is,
Πr(1 + µ(K)/Q) = θΠ(1 + µ(K)/Q).
So
Πr = θΠ,
and through the same analysis
Πs = (1− θ)Π.
The above analysis shows, whatever percentage θ is, it exactly allocates total profits, and
gr = θg
gs = (1− θ)g.
If we define θ as the the proportion of retailer’s procuring cost versus manufacturer’s pro-
duction cost
θ/(1− θ) = (cr +W )/cs,
the relevant cost of retailer is
RCr = θrP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + crQ+WQ+ θg[µ(K)− S(Q,K)]
= θ(RCs +RCr),
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and that of manufacturer is
RCs = (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)S(Q,K) + csQ+ (1− θ)g[µ(K)− S(Q,K)]
= (1− θ)(RCs +RCr).
It is allocated in the same manner as profit. This shows, even in the general case when we
consider lost sale cost as lost profit, we are able to implement the fair and equitable profit
allocation by previous solution, that is, sharing the warranty cost by the rate of procuring
cost to production cost.
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7. Quality Improvement at Coordination
There is an increasing focus on “quality” throughout United States. Many books have
been written describing the philosophy and methods used in the quality movement. This
section is to investigate the economic effects of quality improvement on supply chain coor-
dination, which further stresses the importance of quality and its longrun benefit to each
party in the supply chain.
Sahin and Polatoglu (1998) investigate the impact of product quality on warranty costs
and strategies. On general grounds, there are three ways to improve product quality: up-
grading the manufacturing process, performing inspection on final products before release,
or a burn-in program to eliminate infant mortality. In this paper, we model quality improve-
ment as reduction in probability of aftersale failure. Quality improvement brings multiple
benefits. For current selling season, when the warranty policy is published and production
is already decided, the supply chain will pay less warranty service cost, as fewer failures will
occur. If the revenue and warranty sharing contract is adopted, when the retailer expects
to pay less warranty cost, he is willing to order more in the future selling seasons. The
manufacturer will also redesign the warranty policy to extract maximum benefit from qual-
ity improvement program. We thus expect to observe a recoordination of the supply chain
decision variables Q and K. This raises interesting questions:
How to recoordinate the supply chain?
What is the new equilibrium? Which direction each decision variable will move from old
equilibrium?
How much is the ivestment to achieve profitable quality improvement? Is manufacturer
motivated to initiate a program?
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How are the benefits shared between two parties?
This Chapter attempts to answer above questions through detailed analysis.
In the long run, better quality improves brand image and boost sales. The market de-
mand function moves to new function ˜F (D|K), which incorporates positive response of
demand to continuous quality improvement practice. This long run economic effects have
huge potential. Detail analysis of this situation is left for future research.
7.1 Quality Improvement to Benefit Current Season
A general way to measure quality improvement is to measure the change of failure rate.
In literature failure rate is understood as the rate parameter β in the exponential distri-
bution, if the time to failure is assume to follow an exponential distribution. As we know,
quality improvement activities usually involve investments in upgrading equipments, design,
inspection process or production. Sahin and Polatoglu (1998) investigate the investments
and propose to model them as an overhead cost and a variable cost linear to the proportional
improvement. For example, the variable cost of lowering failure rate (denoted from 20% to
10% should be comparable to that from 10% to 5%, because both programs lower the rate
by half. It matches our intuition that 5% decrease from 10% should be considerably harder
than same 5% decrease from 50%, which has a bigger room to improve. Mathematically,
this can be modeled by a0 + a1(lnβ1 − lnβ2), where failure rate is improved from β1 to β2
(β2 < β1). a0 is the fix overhead, and a1 is the variable cost. The expected product lifetime
is extended from 1β1 to
1
β2
.
If the retailer has accepted the contract and ordered the amount for the current selling
season, quality improvement during this time will not change any decision variables (Q,
K). It will benefit the supply chain through warranty cost savings only. The savings are
represented by
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r(e−β2K
∗ − e−β1K∗)S(Q∗,K∗),
Q∗ and K∗ are optimal order quantity and warranty length coordinated by the revenue and
warranty sharing contract, and assumed constant in this case as the quality improvement
occurs after warranty length and production amount are determined.
The cost of improving β1 to β2 is
a0 + a1(lnβ1 − lnβ2).
The supply chain is motivated to take improvement actions to benefit current season, if
there exists β2 that
r(e−β2K
∗ − e−β1K∗)S(Q∗,K∗) ≥ a0 + a1(lnβ1 − lnβ2).
The marginal warranty cost saving with respect to β2 is
rS(Q∗,K∗)K∗e−β2K
∗
while the marginal quality improvement cost is
a1
1
β2
,
it is possible that there exists no β2 that makes quality improvement “worth the cost” for
current season.
The manufacturer takes a share of (1 − θ) of warranty cost savings, as dictated in revenue
and warranty sharing contract. Assume the quality improvement cost is solely on manufac-
turer, as it usually is, the manufacturer has motivation to launch an improvement program if
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(1− θ)r(e−β2K∗ − e−β1K∗)S(Q∗,K∗) ≥ a0 + a1(lnβ1 − lnβ2).
The marginal saving is
(1− θ)rS(Q∗,K∗)K∗e−β2K∗ ,
which is smaller than supply chain. The pool of feasible β2 that motivates manufacturer is
smaller than that of supply chain. It is possible that the manufacturer is reluctant to take
actions even if it benefits the chain immediately.
Of course considering current benefit is a little bit “short-sighted” as in the long run, supe-
rior quality boosts sales and supply chain will recoordinate its production and warranty to
maximize the benefit. Quality improvement has larger profit potential than warranty cost
savings alone. This is investigated in the next section.
7.2 Quality Improvement to Benefit Future Seasons
7.2.1 Impact on Optimal Q and K
If β is lowered from β1 to β2, the supply chain profit is still concave in Q
∂2Π
∂Q2
= (p− v + g − r(1− e−β2K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0.
The optimal production is larger than previous Q1, however, as it satisfies
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
|Q2 = 1− F (Q2|K) =
c− v
p− v + g − r(1− e−β2K) .
β2 < β1, thus Q2 > Q1. Quality improvement boosts production for the supply chain.
If the manufacturer informs the retailer of quality improvement before ordering, the re-
tailer will adjust the order to maximize his profit. Its profit is still concave in Q with new
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β2
∂2Πr
∂Q2
= ((p− v)φ+ gr − θr(1− e−β2K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0.
The optimal order quantity is larger than previous order quantity/ production level, as it
satisfies
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
|Q2 = 1− F (Q2|K) =
W + cr − vφ
(p− v)φ+ gr − θr(1− e−β2K) .
β2 < β1, thus Q2 > Q1. Besides, from Lemma (5.2.1), we know that the coordinating
contract has the property of
φ(p− v) + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) = λ(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))
W + cr − vφ = λ(c− v);
(7.2.1)
so the above optimal retailer order condition is same as supply chain optimal production
condition. After quality improvement the supply chain is automatically recoordinated from
Q1 to Q2. For the same reason, warranty length is also recoordinated automatically from
K1 to K2. There is not need to change or redesign the contract to achieve new maximum
profit for the chain. This can be seen in Theorem (5.2.3), which shows the coordination
requirement does not involve quality parameters.
Intuitively, with lower failure rate, the optimal warranty length for the supply chain should
be longer than before. This is because the tradeoff between benefit and cost of warranty
moves to make longer warranty more attractive. However, this cannot be completely verified
theoretically. Shown in Lemma (5.2.2), the supply chain always choose the optimal K that
satisfies
(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂K
− rS(Q,K)∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
− g ∂µ(K)
∂K
= 0.
When β becomes smaller, how will the solution of K for above equation cannot be explicitly
determined. It depends on how demand distribution changes over K; whether the sales
and demand distribution is concave or convex to K. We will show that in the numerical
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examples.
7.2.2 Motivation
We show in the last section that the warranty cost savings from quality improvement
will immediately benefit the supply chain in current season. However, sometimes the cost
of quality improvement sets off the warranty savings, and for the current season, the supply
chain expects a loss from that initiative. Does that imply the supply chain is not motivated
to improve quality?
It is still profitable for supply chain to take actions on quality if the benefit after reco-
ordinating Q and K is enough to set of the cost. The benefit will be realized in the next
selling season, when both retailer and manufacturer have chance to adjust their ordering
and warranty decisions. With original β1, the supply chain profit is
Π1(Q∗1,K
∗
1 ) =
[
p− v + g − r(1− e−β1K∗1 )
]
S(Q∗1,K
∗
1 )− (c− v)Q∗1 − gµ(K∗1 );
after decreasing β1 to β2,
Π2(Q∗2,K
∗
2 ) =
[
p− v + g − r(1− e−β2K∗2 )
]
S(Q∗2,K
∗
2 )− (c− v)Q∗2 − gµ(K∗2 ).
As long as the extra profit Π2(Q∗2,K
∗
2 )−Π1(Q∗1,K∗1 ) is bigger than cost a0+a1(lnβ1− lnβ2),
the supply chain will gain a positive return of the investment immediately in the next season,
when the manufacturer redesigns warranty length and the retailer adjusts order quantity.
The manufacturer, however, takes only a share of 1 − θ of the extra profit. It will take
action to improve quality only if this share is able to cover the cost. It is reluctant to im-
prove quality sometimes, even it will benefit the supply chain.
This paper investigates the motivation in single selling season. Quality improvement has
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long term impact to boost sales, establish brand image and save warranty service cost. If
the quality improvement is stable and recognized by the customers, the demand distribution
will move to the right (expected demand increases) even for the same warranty policy. If
the supply chain and manufacturer are more tolerant to the time needed to breakeven, they
will be more motivated to initiate an improvement program. Taking the above factors into
account, future research can be conducted to consider the benefits of quality improvement
in multiple period. We expect the extra profit potential is huge.
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8. Additive Demand Case
Consider a supply chain that faces the random warranty-dependent demand function
as in previous sections. The randomness in demand is warranty independent and can be
modeled either in an additive or a multiplicative fashion. Specifically, demand is defined
as D(K, ε) = y(K) + ε in the additive case (Mills, 1959) and D(K, ε) = y(K)eε in the
multiplicative case (Arrow, S.Karlin, & Scarf, 1962), where y(K) is an increasing function
that captures the dependency between demand and warranty length, and ε is a random
variable defined on the range [-A, A]. We let y(K) = a+ bK(a > 0), (b > 0) in the additive
case, and y(K) = aKb(a > 0), (b > 0) in the multiplicative case. Both representations of
y(K) are similar to the common representations of price-dependent-demand in the economics
literature, with the former representing a linear demand curve and the latter representing
an iso-elastic demand curve (Petruzzi & Dada, 1999). To ensure the demand is nonnegative
in both cases, we require A ≤ a.
In the additive demand case, D(K, ε) = y(K)+ ε, where y(K) = a+ bK(a > 0), (b > 0),
ε ∈ [−A,A] and D ∈ [y(K)−A, y(K) +A]. Let g(·) be the probability density function of
ε, and G(·) be the corresponding cumulative function, we have
f(α|K) = g(α− y(K));F (α|K) = G(α− y(K)).
The expected sales, leftover inventories and lost sales with (Q,K) are respectively
S(Q,K) = Q− ∫ Q
y(K)−A F (α|K)dα
= Q− ∫ q−y(K)−A G(u)dα;
∂F (D|K)
∂K =
∂G(D−a−bK)
∂K
= g(D − a− bK)∂(D−a−bK)∂K
= g(D − a− bK)(−b)
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∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
= b2
dg(ε)
dε
;
I(Q,K) =
∫ Q−y(K)
−A
G(u)du
and
L(Q,K) = µ(K)−Q+
∫ Q−y(K)
−A
G(u)du.
With the revenue and warranty cost sharing contract the retailer’s expected profit is
Πr =(pφ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr −W − cr)Q− [(p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr]∫ Q−y(K)
−A
G(u)du− grµ(K).
The manufacturer’s expected profit is
Πs = [p(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) + gs − cs +Ws]Q
− [(p− v)(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) + gs]
∫ Q−y(K)
−A
G(u)du− gµ(K).
The integrated channel’s profit is
Π = [p+ g − c− rP (Y ≤ K)]Q− [p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K)]
∫ Q−y(K
−A
G(u)du− gµ(K).
Again, according to lemma 5.2.3, for any given K, revenue and warranty sharing contract
coordinates the order quantity if the contract parameters satisfy
φ(p− v) + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) = λ(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))
W + cr − vφ = λ(c− v)
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with grµ(K)Π+gµ(K) < λ <
Π+grµ(K)
Π+gµ(K) . The coordinating order quantity Q satisfies
1−G(Q− y(K)) = c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) .
8.1 Deterministic Additive Demand
8.1.1 Chain Optimization
Deterministic increasing demand is a simple case of additive demand. We assume ε = 0,
that the demand is linear increasing with K
D = a+ bK.
For any given K, the supply chain optimal Q∗ is just to order same amount as the demand.
This can be proved by comparing the profit functions when Q < D, Q = D and Q > D.
When Q < D,
Π(Q,K) = (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))Q− (c− v)Q− gD.
When Q > D,
Π(Q,K) = (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))D − (c− v)Q− gD.
Both of them are less than the profit when Q = D,
Π(Q,K) = (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))D − (c− v)D − gD
= (p− c− rP (Y ≤ K))D
= (p− c− rP (Y ≤ K))(a+ bK).
When Q∗ = D,
dΠ(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p− c− r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK .
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d2Π(K;Q = D)
dK2
= (a+ bK)rβ2e−βK − 2brβe−βK .
When K < 2β − ab , the chain profit function is concave in K; when K ≥ 2β − ab ,
dΠ(K;Q=D)
dK = b(p− c− r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK
≤ b(p− c− r − re−βK).
We know that r > p− c, so b(p− c− r − re−βK) < 0, and thus dΠ(K;Q=D)dK < 0. The chain
profit decreases with K when (a + bK)β ≥ 2b. That means, given the demand elasticity
to warranty (given a and b), increasing warranty length K beyond 2β − ab will diminish the
profit.
So the chain optimal K∗ satisfies first order condition
dΠ(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p− c− r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK = 0.
8.1.2 Coordination of Revenue Sharing Contract with Manufacturer Taking
All the Warranty Cost
The retailer with this contract will automatically choose the chain optimal order amount
Q∗r = Q
∗ = D. This can be shown by comparing its profit functions when Q < D, Q = D
and Q > D. When Q < D,
Πr(Q,K) = pφQ− (W + cr)Q− gr(D −Q)
= (pφ−W − cr)Q− gr(D −Q).
When Q > D,
Πr(Q,K) = pφD − (W + cr)Q+ φv(Q−D)
= ((p− v)φ)D − (W + cr − vφ)Q.
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Both of them are less than the profit when Q = D,
Πr(Q,K) = ((p− v)φ+ gr)D − (W + cr − vφ)D − grD
= ((p− v)φ)D − (W + cr − vφ)D
= (pφ−W − cr)D
= (pφ−W − cr)(a+ bK).
So the order quantity is coordinated at the supply chain optimum Q∗ = D.
When Q∗ = D,
Πs(Q,K) = (p(1− φ)− cs +W − r(1− e−βK))(a+ bK).
Therefore,
d2Πs(K;Q = D)
dK2
= (a+ bK)rβ2e−βK − 2brβe−βK = d
2Π(K;Q = D)
dK2
.
The manufacturer’s profit has the same concavity condition with the chain. When K <
2
β − ab , the profit function is concave in K; when K ≥ 2β − ab ,
dΠs(K;Q=D)
dK = b(p(1− φ)− cs +W − r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK
≤ b(p(1− φ)− cs +W − r − re−βK).
We know that r > p(1 − φ) − cs +W , so b(p(1 − φ) − cs +W − r − re−βK) < 0, and thus
dΠs(K;Q=D)
dK < 0. Same as the chain profit, the manufacturer’s profit decreases with K when
(a+ bK)β ≥ 2b.
When (a+ bK)β < 2b, the profit function is concave in K. The manufacturer’s optimal K∗
satisfies first order condition
dΠs(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p(1− φ)− cs +W − r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK = 0.
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Compared with chain’s optimal condition,
dΠ(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p− c− r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK = 0,
coordination requires,
p(1− φ)− cs +W = p− c.
But that means,
Πs(K∗;Q = D) = Π(K∗;Q = D).
The manufacturer takes all the chain profit and leaves the retailer nonprofitable. If the
retailer makes a positive profit, it requires
p(1− φ)− cs +W < p− c.
Then,
dΠs(K;Q = D)
dK
<
dΠ(K;Q = D)
dK
,
manufacturer will always choose a warranty length that is shorter than the chain optimum.
(K∗s > K
∗).
It is interesting to observe that both wholesale price only contract and revenue sharing
without warranty cost sharing contract distorts the warranty length decision by making the
manufacturer provide a shorter warranty.
8.1.3 Coordination of Revenue and Warranty Sharing Contract
The retailer will automatically choose the chain optimal order amount Q∗r = Q
∗ = D.
This can be shown by comparing its profit functions when Q < D, Q = D and Q > D.
When Q < D,
Πr(Q,K) = ((p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))q − (W + cr − vφ)Q− grD.
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When Q > D,
Πr(Q,K) = ((p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))D − (W + cr − vφ)Q− grD.
Both of them are less than the profit when Q = D,
Πr(Q,K) = ((p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))D − (W + cr − vφ)D − grD
= (pφ−W − cr − θrP (Y ≤ K))D
= (pφ−W − cr − θrP (Y ≤ K))(a+ bK).
So the order quantity is coordinated at the supply chain optimum Q∗ = D.
When Q∗ = D,
Πs(Q,K) = (p(1− φ)− cs +W − (1− θ)r(1− e−βK))(a+ bK).
Therefore,
d2Πs(K;Q = D)
dK2
= (a+ bK)r(1− θ)β2e−βK − 2b(1− θ)rβe−βK = (1− θ)d
2Π(K;Q = D)
dK2
.
The manufacturer’s profit has the same concavity condition with the chain. When (a +
bK)β < 2b, the profit function is concave in K; when (a+ bK)β ≥ 2b,
dΠs(K;Q=D)
dK = b(p(1− φ)− cs +W − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)− (1− θ)(a+ bK)rβe−βK
≤ b[p(1− φ)− cs +W − (1− θ)r]− b(1− θ)re−βK).
We know that (1−θ)r > p(1−φ)−cs+W , so b[p(1−φ)−cs+W−(1−θ)r]−b(1−θ)re−βK) < 0,
and thus dΠs(K;Q=D)dK < 0. Same as the chain profit, when K is greater than
2
β − ab , the
profit will decrease with K. More interesting, if we have parameter b smaller than aβ2 , the
optimal solution for the manufacturer is to provide no warranty to maximize profit.
When (a+ bK)β < 2b, the profit function is concave in K. The manufacturer’s optimal K∗
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satisfies first order condition
dΠs(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p(1− φ)− cs +W − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)− (1− θ)(a+ bK)rβe−βK = 0.
Compared with chain’s optimal condition,
dΠ(K;Q = D)
dK
= b(p− c− r + re−βK)− (a+ bK)rβe−βK = 0,
coordination requires,
p(1− φ)− cs +W = (1− θ)(p− c).
That means,
Πs(K∗;Q = D) = (1− θ)Π(K∗;Q = D).
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9. Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis
In this chapter, we demonstrate supply chain coordination with revenue and warranty
cost sharing contract via a numerical example of a single period case. We assume that
the period’s demand has a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 100. The
mean of the demand distribution is a linear function of the warranty period length, i.e., as
µ(K) = a+ bK, and we let a = 500, b = 30. The remaining parameters in the data set are
as follows:
The exogenous parameters are listed in Table 9.1:
Table 9.1: Exogenous Parameters of the Numerical Example
p cr cs c gr
100 10 40 50 8
gs g v r β
5 13 20 50 1/20
According to the coordination condition (5.2.3), we construct the contract parameters
as shown in Table 9.2:
Table 9.2: Contract Parameters of the Numerical Example
W φ θ
22.8 0.5 0.35
We assume β = 1/20, i.e., the expected lifetime of the product is 20 years. Practically
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any warranty period length less than 10 years sounds realistic. If the warranty period is
longer than 10 years, the probability of two failures is significant and cannot be ignored. For
example, for a warranty period of 10 years, the probability of having two or more failures is
only 0.09, whereas under a 15 years warranty, this probability increases to 0.17 and under a
20 years warranty, this probability is 0.26. Two or more claims during the warranty period
of one purchase is beyond the scope of this research.
9.1 Coordination
We iterate the warranty period length from 0 to 10 years, with 1 year increment. The
supply chain profits for various Q and K are shown in Figure 15.1. The profits are concave
in both Q and K, and a longer warranty generally requires larger Q to achieve the supply
chain maximum profit. For each warranty period length, we derive the supply chain’s optimal
order quantity Q∗ according to (3.3.3). We then calculate the supply chain’s profit for each
K and find the largest one as the chain optimal solution of K∗ and Q∗. The results are
shown in Table 14.1, which shows that the optimal warranty length for the supply chain and
the manufacturer are both 4 years. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the supply
chain’s production level is 657 units. Both production level and the warranty period length
are coordinated. The supply chain now has a total profit of m$22, 245. The manufacturer
and the retailer both achieve their maximum profits of $6, 775 and $15, 470, respectively.
9.2 Robustness of The Revenue and Warranty Sharing Contract
What if one party makes an error and does not make its optimal decision? For example,
what if the manufacturer does not offer the optimal and coordinating warranty of 4 years,
but instead makes a conservative offer of 3 or 2 years; or the warranty policy is 4 years,
but the retailer chooses an order amount other than the optimal one? In this section, we
analyze the robustness of the supply chain performance to deviations from optimal decisions.
We expect the supply chain will perform suboptimally as a result of such deviation. From
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Table 14.1, we see that if the manufacturer provides a 3 year warranty, the retailer will
respond to this by ordering 629 units. This amount is optimal for the adopted warranty
length, but fewer than the theoretical amount of 656 units under a 4 year warranty period.
The supply chain now achieves a total profit of the $22, 205, which is 99.8% of optimum.
If the manufacturer provides a 5 year warranty, the retailer will respond to this policy by
ordering 684 units, which is larger than the optimum 656 warranty of under a 4 year war-
ranty. The supply chain, thus, achieves a total profit of $22, 150, which is 99.8% of the
optimum. The results show that even if the manufacturer’s warranty decision deviates sig-
nificantly from optimum, the final profit does not deviate much from the maximum, because
the retailer’s ordering decision will be the same as the supply chain’s optimum. The supply
chain’s performance is quite robust with respect to deviations from the manufacturer’s op-
timal warranty policy. This robustness results from the “Double Optimization” scheme of
the revenue and warranty sharing contract. If the manufacturer’s warranty decision deviates
from the optimum, the retailer will respond to this. Instead of responding to the theoretical
optimal order amount associated with the optimal K∗, the retailer maximizes its profit un-
der the actual warranty policy. Under coordination its decision also maximizes the supply
chain’s total profit under actual warranty period length. Thus, the retailer’s action partially
recovers the loss from the “erroneous” warranty policy.
Under the optimal warranty policy of 4 years, if the retailer makes a conservative deci-
sion of ordering 20% less, as shown in Table 14.2, the supply chain will achieve 87.6% of
maximum, and the manufacturer and the retailer are able to achieve 91.5% and 86.0% of
their respective maximum profits. This shows that the supply chain’s performance is fairly
insensitive to the retailer’s error. This is because the manufacturer has already made the
right decision of the warranty length and has partially ensured good performance of the
supply chain. It is another example of the advantage of the “Double Optimization” aspect
of the revenue and warranty sharing contract.
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9.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Market Demand Responsiveness
We assume that the market demand responds positively to the warranty period, as rep-
resented by the function µ(K) = a + bK (b > 0). The value of b indicates to which the
warranty period length impacts expected market demand. For every one year increase in
the warranty period, the expected market demand will increase by b units. It represents the
market demand responsiveness to a change in the warranty length. The parameter a is the
expected market demand if no warranty is offered. It is set to 500 units in this example.
We vary the parameter from 25 to 35 and examine how the optimal solutions of Q∗ and K∗
move with b, resulting in changes in the supply chain maximum profit and those of each
chain member. The results are shown in Table 14.6.
Figure 15.2 shows that the optimal warranty period K∗ increases with increasing b. Longer
warranty period convinces consumers that the product quality is superior, or consumers
value the warranty as an important part of the product and service package, and hence their
intent to buy can be positively influenced by a longer warranty length. However, a longer
warranty period incurs more expected warranty service costs. The tradeoff between higher
demand and larger costs makes the optimal warranty period K∗ concave in b, as shown in
Table 15.2.
Figure 15.2 also shows that the optimal order quantity increases with b. This matches
our intuition that if the market demand is more sensitive to the warranty period, the man-
ufacturer is likely to offer a longer warranty period, hence the demand forecast increases,
which encourages the retailer to order more.
Figure 15.4 illustrates the optimal profits of the supply chain and each of its members
for different values of b. As expected, with larger b, the market demand is more sensitive
to the warranty period. A longer warranty is thus effective in stimulating demand. This is
reflected by larger expected revenue and profits for the supply chain and its members. One
89
interesting observation is that the manufacturer seems to benefit more from this than the
retailer, due to the profit allocation shown below
Πr = θΠ+ θgµ(K)− grµ(K),
Πs = (1− θ)Π− θgµ(K) + grµ(K).
In this example we let θ = 0.35 and is held constant. The parameters gr = 8 > θg = 4.55,
so the retailer, compared with the manufacturer loses more for unit of lost sales. With a
larger demand forecast, the retailer will order more, but the percentile of its order on the
demand distribution is lower (as shown in Figure 15.3) so that the optimal Q∗ approaches
expected demand with larger b. When the demand distribution shifts to the right, the
retailer experiences larger lost sales. The tradeoff between the expected revenue increase
and more lost sales makes the retailer’s benefit less from a better warranty.
9.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Quality Improvement
We define β as the failure rate, which represents the expected number of failures within
one year for each unit purchased. We follow the conventional model that the quality im-
provement cost is loglinear in the failure rate (Sahin & Polatoglu, 1998), and as expressed
as a0 + a1(lnβ1 − lnβ2).
9.4.1 Quality Improvement to Benefit a Single Period
We demonstrated in Chapter 7 that quality improvement will benefit the supply chain, as
well as each party in the chain through warranty cost savings, a larger retailer order amount,
or a larger demand through a better warranty. We proved that the contract does not need
to be redesigned to coordinate the chain with improved quality. However, the optimal order
quantity does increase. We cannot show explicitly whether the optimal warranty length
will increase, because it depends on how the demand distribution responds quantitatively to
change in warranty, and whether the relationship is concave or convex. We show in Table
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14.5 that in our numerical example, the optimal warranty period length does increase.
We set a0 = 800, a1 = 1200, and the original failure rate β1 = 0.05. As shown in Figure
15.5, the quality improvement cost increases as the failure rate decreases, and is a convex
function of the new failure rate. Reducing β from 0.032 to 0.03 requires more investment
than lowering it from 0.048 to 0.046.
In a scenario involving a single period and a single product, improved quality lowers the
warranty service cost, and encourages the manufacturer to offer a longer warranty period
and hence boosts expected demand. We assume a0 = 800 and a1 = 1200 to represent re-
spectively the fixed overhead and variable costs of quality improvement. In Figure 15.6 it
appears that the supply chain optimal profit is convex in quality cost and increases with each
additional $1, 000 invested in quality. Without considering the quality improvement cost,
the supply chain profit is higher. The net profit (profit without the quality improvement
cost), however, is first lower than original, due to the overhead cost, but then goes up when
the improvement in β is significant.
Figure 15.7 shows that the expected demand is convex and increases with the investment
in quality. Also the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with demand. However, the
difference between them becomes smaller. With a constant demand standard deviation, the
retailer is more conservative in increasing the order quantity than the supply chain in case of
higher demand forecast. This is a result of the tradeoff of inventory risk, lost sales risk and
sales increase from ordering more, and is another reason that the retailer does not benefit
as much from a demand increase as the manufacturer, as shown in Figure 15.4.
As shown in Figure 15.8, the optimal warranty period is convex and increases with the
quality investment, consistent with expected demand.
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9.5 Fair and Equitable Profit Allocation
9.5.1 Special Case
In Chapter 6, we considered a fair and equitable manner of sharing the benefits resulting
from coordination, by allocating profits proportionally to the relevant costs of the two parties
involved. We showed in the special case, when lost sales cost gr and gs are negligible,
that this fair allocation can be implemented by simply defining the warranty cost share
θ using θ/(1 − θ) = (cr + W )/cs, and by letting θ dictate the retailer’s profit share. In
our numerical example, if gr = gs = 0, we show the fair profit allocations in Table 14.3.
The proportion of the retailer’s unit procurement cost to manufacturer’s production cost is
(cr +W )/cs = θ/(1 − θ) = 0.724, which means that θ = 0.42. The coordinating contract
parameters are, thus, W = 18.99, φ = 0.5 and θ = 0.42. The optimal solution shows that
the optimal warranty length as 4 years and optimal order quantity as 639 units. The retailer
takes 41% of the supply chain profit, while the manufacturer takes 59%. This is roughly the
same as that dictated by θ = 0.42. The cost sharing follows exactly the same allocation:
retailer bears 42% of the total supply chain cost, while manufacturer bears 58%.
9.5.2 General Case
We now analyze the case where the lost sales cost is not negligible. Since the unit lost
sales cost consists mainly of lost profit, we show in the following example that a fair profit
allocation is achieved the same way as setting θ/(1− θ) = (cr +W )/cs.
By setting gr = Πr/Q and gs = Πs/Q, we assume that the lost sales cost is equal to
lost profit opportunity. As before, from the exogenous parameters cr, W and cs, we derive
the fair θ as 0.42. The corresponding coordinating contract has the wholes sale price W
equal to 18.67 and the revenue sharing parameter φ equal to 0.5. The optimal warranty
policy is still 4 years and the optimal order quantity is 679 units. The final profit and cost
are shown in Table 14.4. As expected, both the profit share and the cost share matches
the warranty cost share θ = 0.42. Besides, the unit lost sales cost for the retailer and the
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manufacturer are respectively gr = Πr/Q∗ = 15 and gs = Πs/Q∗ = 22.
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10. Efficiency of Non-coordinating Contract
Although coordination and flexible profit allocation are desirable features, contracts with
those properties might be costly to administer if they require extra information collection
and coordination actions. As a result, a simple non-coordinating contract may be worth
adopting if it is ”efficient”. The efficiency of a non-coordinating contract E is defined as the
ratio of supply chain profit with the contract to the supply chain’s optimal profit ΠΠo . In
this Chapter we theoretically prove that higher wholesale price lowers retailer’s profit and
makes the supply chain less efficient; improvement in production cost, warranty cost and
quality helps to build a more efficient supply chain.
10.1 Efficiency of Wholesale Contract without Warranty Cost Sharing
10.1.1 Efficiency of Order quantity
To obtain insight of efficiency with respect to order quantity, we first assume the man-
ufacturer chooses the chain optimal warranty length Ks = Ko. Define the efficiency in this
case EQ given Ks.
For any wholesale price offer W , the retailer optimizes its profit by choosing Q∗r(W ). Based
on our previous analysis, Q∗r(W ) is unique for any given W , but varies with different W .
The set of (Q∗r(W ),W ) contains all possible wholesale price offers and their corresponding
order responses. Nevertheless, all Q∗r(W ) are less than the supply chain optimal production
level as long as W is larger than chain optimal price for manufacturer to make a positive
profit. The realized supply chain is sub-optimal.
The manufacturer, on the other hand, has full knowledge of retailer’s optimization problem
and expects retailer’s response Q∗r(W ) for anyW it offers. The manufacturer thus optimizes
its own profit from choosing an optimal pair of (Q∗r(W
∗
s ),W
∗
s ) among the set of all whole-
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sale offers and corresponding retailer’s responses. For manufacturer, the optimal solution
(Q∗s = Q
∗
r(W
∗
s ),W
∗
s ) is unique and does not depend on any other endogenous parameters. In
this Chapter we first investigate how the wholesale price affects retailer’s order decision and
the supply chain expected sales, and thus the realized retailer’s profit, supply chain’s profit
and the contract efficiency; then explore the manufacturer’s optimization problem. This
problem is not fully examined yet in the previous analysis where we only confirm that the
supply chain’s optimal wholesale price and production is never optimal to manufacturer.
Here we introduce an interesting property of most demand distributions: the Increasing
Generalized Failure Rate (IGFR) and discover that if the demand is IGFR, the supplier’s
profit function is unimodal. Our analysis shows that improvement in production, warranty
serving cost and production quality increases supply chain’s realized production and profit.
The supplier and retailer are both better off through lower wholesale price. The results are
intuitive, however, our analysis provides the quantitative marginal change of retailer’s order,
expected sales, retailer’s and supply chain’s profit with respect to manufacturer’s wholesale
price; and the marginal change of that wholesale price with respect to exogenous parameters.
Sensitivity of Order Quantity to Wholesale Price
We know the retailer’s expected profit Πr is
Πr(Q;W,K) = (p− v + gr)S(Q)− (W + cr − v)Q− grµ(K).
Based on our previous analysis, the retailer chooses optimal Q∗r that satisfies
∂S(Q)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q∗r) =
W + cr − v
p− v + gr
to maximize its profit.
Thus
dQ∗r
dW
= − 1
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
.
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It shows the marginal change of order quantity with wholesale price. It is not surprising
that higher wholesale price discourages the retailer to order more. Besides, the amount of
change depends on the demand density of order amount. It is consistent with our intuition
that if the probability of demand as Q∗r is high, the retailer is more willing to stick to current
order amount and less sensitive to wholesale price change. A salvage item brings retailer a
revenue of v, one unit stock out causes a shortage loss of gr; thus the revenue of one unit
regular sale can be standardized as p − v + gr. Our analysis also shows that with bigger
standardized regular revenue, the retailer is less sensitive to the order price.
The sensitivity of sales to wholesale price is
dS(Q∗r)
dW =
dS(Q∗r)
dQ∗r
· dQ∗rdW
= − W+cr−vf(Q∗r)(p−v+gr)
= − 1−F (Q∗r)f(Q∗r)(p−v+gr) .
It shows sales also move negatively with wholesale price. The marginal sales increase with
lower whole sale price is related to the classical hazard rate h(Q) = f(Q)
F¯ (Q)
, which gives
roughly the percentage decrease in the probability of a stock out from increasing the stock-
ing quantity by one unit. Our analysis shows the marginal increase in sales is proportional
to the reverse of hazard rate.
Define υ(Q∗r) = −WQ∗r
dQ∗r
dW the order quantity elasticity with respect to W is (Kreps, 1990),
υ(Q∗r) =
F¯ (Q∗r)− (cr − v)/(p− v + gr)
Q∗rf(Q∗r)
.
Define g(Q) = Qf(Q)
F¯ (Q)
the generalized failure rate. Different from hazard rate, it gives the
percentage decrease in the probability of a stock out from increasing the stocking quantity
by 1% roughly. A distribution has an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) if g(Q) is
weakly increasing for all Q such that F (Q) < 1 (Lariviere & Porteus, 2001). If cr = v,
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υ(Q∗r) =
1
g(Q∗r)
. Then if demand is IGFR, the order amount Q has a decreasing elasticity.
Let ΠD be the realized decentralized supply chain profit given in comparison with opti-
mal chain profit Πo. Define EQ = Π
D
Πo the efficiency of the contract with respect to Q, we
derive the theorem
Theorem 10.1.1. Higher wholesale price makes the supply chain less efficient.
10.1.2 Retailer Profit with Respect to W
At optimum Q∗r
dS(Q∗r)
dW
= − 1− F (Q
∗
r)
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
,
dQ∗r
dW
= − 1
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
,
and
1− F (Q∗r) =
W + cr − v
p− v + gr .
Thus, the derivative of Πr with respect to W is
∂Πr
∂W = (p− v + gr)∂S(Qr)∂W −Qr − (W + cr − v)∂Qr∂W
= −Q∗r .
It is not surprising that higher wholesale price lowers retailer profit. Our analysis provides
shows that this marginal profit is equal to the order quantity and is more significant when
W is small (lower W , bigger Q∗r).
10.1.3 Manufacturer Profit
With the knowledge that the retailer will order Q∗r(W ) corresponding to each W , the
manufacturer will maximize its profit
Πs(W ;Q∗r(W ),K) = (W − cs)Q∗r(W ) + (gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗r(W ))− gsµ(K);
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Check whether Πs is unimodal on W .
The first order derivative of Πs to W is
∂Πs
∂W = Q
∗
r − F¯ (Q
∗
r)(p−v+g−rP (y≤K))−(c−v)
f(Q∗r)(p−v+gr)
= Q∗r − W−cs+(gs−rP (y≤K))(W+Cr−v)/(p−v+gr)(f(Q∗r))(p−v+gr) .
From supply chain’s profit Π ≥ 0 we have
p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− (p− v + gr) = gs − rP (y ≤ K) ≥ −(p− v + gr).
That is,
gs − rP (y ≤ K)
p− v + gr ≥ −1.
So if the demand follows a uniform distribution, the second order derivative
∂2Πs
∂W 2
=
∂Q∗r
∂W
− 1 + (gs − rP (y ≤ K))/(p− v + gr)
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
≤ 0.
and thus Πs(W ;Q∗r(W ),K) is concave on W .
Generally,
∂2Πs
∂W 2
=
∂Q∗r
∂W
− 1 + (gs − rP (y ≤ K))/(p− v + gr)
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
+
W + (gs − rP (y ≤ K))(W + Cr − v)/(p− v + gr)
(f(Q∗r))2(p− v + gr)2
· ∂f(Q
∗
r)
∂W
.
Since ∂f(Q
∗
r)
∂W =
df(Q)
dQ · ∂Q
∗
r(W )
∂W , the above equation is non-positive if the demand distribution
is increasing (df(Q)/dQ ≥ 0).
If Πs is concave inW andW ∗ satisfies ∂Πs∂W = 0,W
∗ is the optimal price to the manufacturer.
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So the manufacturer will choose (W ∗, Q∗r) that follow
Q∗r =
F¯ (Q∗r)(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− (c− v)
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
and
F¯ (Q∗r) =
W + cr − v
p− v + gr .
If we assume cr, v, gr, gs = 0 to standardize the problem, Q∗r of the decentralized supply
chain will settle to the solution of the equation with one unknown
Q∗r =
F¯ (Q∗r)(p− rP (y ≤ K))− cs
f(Q∗r)p
,
and the wholesale price determined by the manufacturer to induce this Q∗r is
W ∗ = pF¯ (Q∗r).
Unfortunately most conventional demand distributions, such as normal, gamma and Poisson
do not necessarily satisfy these conditions to ensure concavity of Πs.
10.1.4 Unimodality of Manufacturer Profit Function
We know that
Πs(Q
∗
r ;Q
∗
r(W ),K)
Q∗r
= (W − cs) +Q∗r dWdQ∗r + (gs − rP (y ≤ K))
∂S(Q∗r)
∂Q∗r
= F¯ (Q∗r)[(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− Q
∗
rf(Q
∗
r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
(p− v + gr)]− (c− v).
We show that
Theorem 10.1.2. If the demand distribution is IGFR, the manufacturer’s expected profit
function is unimodal in Q∗r and the unique optimal Q
∗
s satisfies
Q∗s =
F¯ (Q∗s)(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− (c− v)
f(Q∗s)(p− v + gr)
. (10.1.1)
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10.1.5 Sensitivity of Manufacturer Profit Function
The optimal Q∗s is obtained from (10.1.1) and thus the maximum Πs can be solved for
any set of exogenous parameters p, v, g, c etc. How does it react to those parameters?
Sensitivity to Net Production Cost
Suppose the manufacturer improves the production process by, for example, implement-
ing advanced technology or achieving more bargain power in procurement. His unit pro-
duction cost cs gets smaller. Equation (10.1.1) shows optimal quantity Q∗s gets larger. The
manufacturer is better off by charging a lower W to encourage the retailer to order more.
This is proved as follows.
Let cs1 be the original production cost, cs2 be the current production cost (cs1 > cs2), then
from (10.1.1), the manufacturer now asks for a smaller wholesale price (Ww1) > (Ww2).
Let Q∗s1, Q
∗
s2 be the original and current order quantity, respectively, then Q
∗
s1 < Q
∗
s2 and
S(Q∗s1) < S(Q
∗
s2) because (
∂S(Q)
Q > 0). Then the original manufacturer’s profit
Π∗s1 = (Ww1 − cs1)Q∗s1 + (gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗s1)− gsµ(K)
< (Ww1 − cs2)Q∗s1 + (gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗s1)− gsµ(K)
because cs1 > cs2.
Q∗s1 = Q
∗
r(Ww1) is a function ofW and unrelated to the change in cs, so (Ww1, Q
∗
s1) is also a
feasible solution of Πs2 with cs2. But its profit is less than the maximum profit Π∗s2, because
(Ww2, Q∗s2) is the unique optimal solution.
(Ww1 − cs2)Q∗s1 + (gs − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗s1)− gsµ(K) < Π∗s2.
This shows improved production increases manufacturer’s profit. The retailer’s profit is also
better off. The whole supply chain achieves a higher profit. The proof is analogous to above.
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Sensitivity to Unit Warranty Cost
How does the order amount and manufacturer’s profit change with unit warranty cost
r?
From (10.1.1), we have
Q∗sf(Q
∗
r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
=
(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))
p− v + gr −
(c− v)
(p− v + gr)(F¯ (Q∗r))
If the manufacturer is able to improve the warranty process to reduce r, the optimal order
amount Q∗s for the manufacturer will increase if the demand is IGFR. That means, the
manufacturer is able to charge a lower whole sale price to encourage retailer to order more.
The manufacturer’s’s total profit is bigger, so is the retailer’s. The total supply chain’s profit
increases. The proof is analogous to the sensitivity to production cost.
Let r1 be the original warranty cost, r2 be the current warranty cost r1 > r2. Let Q∗s1, Q
∗
s2
be the original and current order quantity, respectively, then Q∗s1 < Q
∗
s2 and S(Q
∗
s1) <
S(Q∗s2). Then from the elasticity of Q
∗
r toW , (Ww1) > (Ww2). Then original manufacturer’s
maximum profit
Π∗s1 = (Ww1 − cs)Q∗s1 + (gs − r1P (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗s1)− gsµ(K)
< (Ww1 − cs)Q∗s1 + (gs − r2P (Y ≤ K))S(Q∗s1)− gsµ(K)
because r1 > r2.
Q∗s1 = Q
∗
r(Ww1) is a function of W and unrelated to the change in r, so (Ww1, Q
∗
s1) is also
a feasible solution of Πs2 with r2. But its profit is less than the maximum Π∗s2, because
(Ww2, Q∗s2) is the unique optimal solution. The manufacturer’s maximum profit is higher.
So is the retailer’s profit because it increases with lower whole sale price. Thus the total
supply chain’s profit increases.
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Sensitivity to Product Quality
From
Q∗sf(Q
∗
r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
=
(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))
p− v + gr −
(c− v)
(p− v + gr)(F¯ (Q∗r))
we see that if the product quality improves, i.e., for same warranty length K, the failure
rate P (y ≤ K) is reduced, the optimal order amount Q∗s for the manufacturer will increase
if the demand is IGFR. That means, the manufacturer is able to charge a lower whole sale
price to encourage retailer to order more. The manufacturer’s total profit is bigger, so is the
retailer’s. The total supply chain’s profit increases. The proof is analogous to above.
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11. Conclusion and Future Research
In today’s highly competitive global marketplace, customers demand lower prices, better
quality and higher levels of service. To compete in such business environments, enterprises
need to exert substantial efforts to streamline their operations, and improve communications
and collaboration with every other entity in the supply chains. With the development of the
Internet and Business-to-Business technologies, supply chain solutions are more scalable and
information exchanges are faster and easier. These make close collaboration among supply
chain players possible. However, without an effective coordination mechanism each member
in the chain is primarily concerned with its own individual profit, and the total supply chain
performance may not optimally be achieved unless incentives of the supply chain are not
aligned. A supply chain is coordinated if the optimal decisions of the individual parties are
the same as the supply chain’s optimal solution. This is desired because with the supply
chain’s maximum profit achieved, both entities in the chain have a “bigger pie” to share.
This thesis proposed a contract mechanism to coordinate the supply chain’s decision of
production quantity in conjunction with a free replacement warranty. We examined four
forms of contracts, namely wholesale price only contracts and revenue sharing contracts with
or without warranty cost sharing, for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer
in the context of a single period, single product newsvendor model. This work contributes to
the existing literature by considering warranty period optimization towards a supply chain
coordination. We demonstrated that the wholesale price only contract does not coordinate
the order quantity or the warranty length decision due to “double marginalization”. The
manufacturer, in order to make a positive profit, offers a contract with a unit wholesale
price higher than its unit production cost. Under such a wholesale contract price, the re-
tailer always orders a quantity less than the supply chain’s optimum, as its marginal cost
of ordering one more unit is the unit wholesale price plus the procurement cost, which is
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higher than the marginal cost of the supply chain. The profit realized is, thus, less than the
supply chain’s optimum. The revenue sharing contract with the manufacturer bearing all
the warranty costs coordinates the order quantity. However, this type of a contract coordi-
nates the warranty length with only one manner of profit allocation. In practice, the profit
allocation between the parties depends on their respective negotiation power, and a contract
needs to be flexible in terms of allocating profit in order to be adopted under different situ-
ations. The revenue and warranty cost sharing contract, on the other hand, coordinates the
production/order quantity and the warranty period length, with the contract parameters
satisfying the quantitative conditions in Theorem 5.2.5. With coordination, the profit of
each party ranges from 0 to 100% of chain profit depending on the parameter, which is
derived explicitly for contract implementation.
The results obtained from this research lead to some interesting managerial insights. They
suggest that revenue and warranty cost should be shared between the members in a supply
chain, so that the inventory risk, demand risk and warranty service risk are shared. In this
way, the incentives of the different members are aligned with the supply chain goals through
the alignment of their marginal revenues and costs with those of the supply chain.
After developing a general framework for coordinated revenue and warranty sharing con-
tracts, the coordination equilibrium was examined in details. A fair and equitable manner
of sharing benefit from coordination was considered as sharing profit by the relevant cost or
capital invested by each party. We showed that this is achieved by dictating the warranty
share same as the variable cost per unit, i.e., the manufacturer’s unit production cost to
retailer’s unit purchase and procurement cost.
The impact of quality improvement was also investigated. The results supported the in-
sight from Theorem 5.2.5 that, at coordination if product quality changes, the contract with
its original parameters (the wholesale price, and revenue and warranty cost share) still coor-
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dinates the supply chain and does not need to be redesigned to maximize the supply chain’s
profit. However, the optimal decisions order quantity and warranty length decisions are
different in the new equilibrium. With better quality both of them are larger. Furthermore,
the manufacturer was assumed to bear all the quality improvement costs, as commonly ob-
served in practice, while it takes only a portion of the extra revenue from the stimulated
demand. Its marginal profit from quality improvement is less than the supply chain’s and
it is, thus, less motivated to initiate a quality improvement program.
Numerical testing of the case of additive demand under revenue and warranty sharing con-
tract was conducted, followed by an extensive sensitivity analysis, in order to understand the
impact of change in contract parameters on the optimal solutions and profits realized at the
coordination. It was illustrated that the coordination is robust, that is, in the aspect that if
either party deviates from the optimal decisions, the final profit achieved by both members
and the supply chain does not deviate much from optimum. Additionally, we showed that
the optimal decisions at coordination change with different levels of market responsiveness
to warranty length. Serving a market more responsive to warranty length, the manufacturer
has a longer optimal warranty period. The maximum profits achieved by the supply chain
and both members in the chain also increase with responsiveness. This demonstrated that
if a supply chain faces a market where the customers’ incentive to purchase can be largely
influenced by warranty length, a longer warranty period should be offered to stimulate the
demand and achieve maximum profit. Also, our numerical results showed the supply chain’s
net profit (profit minus quality improvement cost) can increase in a single period due to
quality improvement. The one time improvement has to be significant above a threshold
(represented by the failure rate lower than a specific value) to cancel out the fixed overhead
cost and increase net profit.
A simple non-coordinating contract, such as wholesale price only contract, requires less
information exchange and administration and is less costly to implement. Compared with
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a coordinated contract, it might be worth adopting in practice if it is “efficient”, where
“efficiency” is defined as the ratio of realized supply chain profit under the contract over the
theoretical optimal supply chain’s profit. It was demonstrated that with a wholesale price
only contract, a higher wholesale price lowers retailer’s profit and makes the supply chain
less efficient; reduction in production cost, warranty cost and improvement in quality helps
to build a more efficient supply chain.
This dissertation represented a preliminary study in supply chain coordination via con-
tracts with warranty. It was developed under some simplifying assumptions, which may
be extended in future research to account for more complicated situations. To date we de-
veloped a coordinated contract by primarily focusing on wholesale contracts and revenue
sharing contracts. In practice various other contract forms, such as buyback contracts and
sales rebate contracts, are frequently adopted. Those contract types offer great potential for
future research. Additionally, this research was limited to the single product, single period
model. Future research can explore multiple period models, where inventory holding cost
throughout multiple periods may play a role in the profit function. Quality improvement
can also be analyzed in the long term for its impact on customer satisfaction, brand image
and reputation besides the short term benefit of saving warranty service costs.
It was assumed that the manufacturer dominates the relationship in the supply chain and
is the contract designer. The retailer can only decide whether to accept the contracts. This
can be extended to the situation where both parties have some decision power on the con-
tract design and modeled by setting positive thresholds of each party’s expected profit. The
retailer will accept a contract only if it offers an expected profit higher than the threshold.
This research considered a one-to-one relationship between the members in a supply chain.
In practice it is common, though, that the manufacturer serves multiple retailers, or the
retailer procures from multiple competing manufacturers. Addressing coordination in a
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competitive many-to-many relationship presents another challenge for future research.
This thesis examined the supply chain coordination with a focus on manufacturer free re-
placement warranty. Future research may explore coordination under different warranty
forms, such as priced warranty and renewing warranty, among others. Finally, the manu-
facturer and the retailer were assumed to be risk neutral in this research. Future research
should explore those situations where parties in the supply chain are risk averse or risk seek-
ing, and consider supply chain coordination when each member maximizes his individual
utility.
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12. Appendix 1 Proof of Lemmas and Theorems
12.1 Proof of a Preliminary Lemma
Lemma 12.1.1. For any function f(x, y), if
 x
∗(y) = argmaxx f(x; y)
y∗ = argmaxy f(x∗(y), y)
,
then (x∗ = x∗(y∗), y∗) = argmax(x,y) f(x, y).
Proof. Lemma 12.1.1
if
df(x; y)
dx
|x∗(y)= 0;
d2f(x; y)
dx2
≤ 0,
then x∗(y) = argmaxx f(x; y).
If
df(x∗(y); y)
dy
|y∗= 0;
and
d2f(x∗(y); y)
dy2
≤ 0.
then y∗ = argmaxy f(x∗(y), y).
We know that
df(x∗(y),y)
dy =
∂f(x,y)
∂x |x∗(y) dx
∗(y)
dy +
∂f(x,y)
∂y
= 0 · dx∗(y)dy + ∂f(x,y)∂y
= ∂f(x,y)∂y
thus
∂f(x, y)
∂y
|y∗= 0.
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Plus
d2f(x∗(y), y)
dy2
=
∂2f(x, y)
∂x2
(
∂x∗(y)
∂y
)2
+ 2
∂2f(x, y)
∂x∂y
dx∗(y)
dy
+
∂f(x, y)
∂x
d2x∗(y)
dy2
+
∂2f(x, y)
∂y2
.
Because x∗(y) satisfies the first order condition
∂f(x, y)
∂x
=
df(x; y)
dx
= 0,
the above second order condition to y is
d2f(x∗(y), y)
dy2
=
∂2f(x, y)
∂x2
(
dx∗(y)
dy
)2 + 2
∂2f(x, y)
∂x∂y
dx∗(y)
dy
+
∂2f(x, y)
∂y2
so
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
d2f(x∗(y),y)
dy2 = (
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2 )
2(dx
∗(y)
dy )
2 + 2∂
2f(x,y)
∂x∂y
dx∗(y)
dy
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2 +
∂2f(x,y)
∂y2
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
= ∂
2f(x,y)
∂y2
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2 + (
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
dx∗(y)
∂y +
∂2f(x,y)
∂x∂y )
2 − (∂2f(x,y)∂x∂y )2.
From df(x;y)dx |x∗(y)= 0, we have
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
dx∗(y)
∂y +
∂2f(x,y)
∂x∂y =
∂
∂f(x,y)
∂x
∂y
= 0,
so the second derivative with respective to y is
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2
d2f(x∗(y),y)
dy2 =
∂2f(x,y)
∂y2
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2 − (∂
2f(x,y)
∂x∂y )
2 ≤ 0.
Thus, as long as  x
∗(y) = argmaxx f(x; y)
y∗ = argmaxy f(x∗(y), y)
,
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we have 
d2f(x;y)
dx2 ≤ 0
∂2f(x,y)
∂y2
∂2f(x,y)
∂x2 − (∂
2f(x,y)
∂x∂y )
2 ≤ 0
.
This means the Hessian matrix of f(x, y) is negative semidefinite.
What is more, it also satisfies
∂f(x,y)
∂x |x∗(y∗)= 0;
∂f(x,y)
∂y |y∗= 0.
This proves that if  x
∗(y) = argmaxx f(x; y)
y∗ = argmaxy f(x∗(y), y)
,
we have
(x∗ = x∗(y∗), y∗) = argmax
(x,y)
f(x, y).
2
12.2 Lemmas and Theorems of Wholesale Only Contracts
Proof. Lemma 4.1.1
As long as the retailer earns a positive profit we have
p− v + gr > 0.
Its profit function is then concave in Q for any fixed K because
∂2Πr
∂Q2 = (p− v + gr)∂
2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= (p− v + gr)(−f(Q|K))
< 0.
The necessary and sufficient condition to maximize the retailer’s profit for given K is
∂Πr
∂Q
= (p− v + gr)∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
+ (v −W − cr) = 0.
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That is,
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
w + cr − v
p− v + gr .
From (3.3.3) we know that the supply chain optimal condition is
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) .
Since
∂S(Q)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|k)
is decreasing in Q for given K, the sufficient condition for coordination is to make the
retailer’s profit an affine function of the supply chain’s profit:
w + cr − v
p− v + gr =
c− v
p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K) .
In other words the manufacturer should choose
W =
(p− v + gr)(c− v)
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) − (cr − v).
Let
λ =
p− v + gr
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) =
w + cr − v
c− v ,
the retailer’s profit is then
Πr = λ(Π + gµ(K))− grµ(K).
If λ < 1, the manufacturer has to charge a wholesale price less than the production cost
to coordinate the chain. If λ ≥ 1, the manufacturer charges a wholesale price higher than
production cost but still earns a negative profit to coordinate the supply chain because the
retailer’s profit is greater than the whole supply chain’s profit. In that case the manufacturer
pays more warranty cost and lost sales cost than its revenue from the wholesale. Practically
111
the wholesale contract without warranty cost sharing does not coordinate the supply chain.
2
Proof. Lemma 4.2.1
As long as the retailer earns a positive profit we have its profit function concave in Q for
any fixed K because
∂2Πr
∂Q2 = (p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))∂
2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= (p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K))
< 0.
The necessary and sufficient condition to maximize the retailer’s profit for given K is
∂Πr
∂Q
= (p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
− (W + cr − v) = 0.
That is,
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
W + cr − v
p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) .
From (3.3.3) we know that the supply chain optimal condition is
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) .
Since
∂S(Q)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|k)
is decreasing in Q for given K, the sufficient condition for coordination is to make the
retailer’s profit an affine function of the supply chain’s profit:
W + cr − v = λ(c− v); p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) = λ(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K)).
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The retailer’s profit is then
Πr = λ(Π + gµ(K))− grµ(K).
For the manufacturer to earn a positive profit, W has to be greater than cs. Therefore,
λ > 1. The retailer’s profit in this case is larger than the whole channel’s profit. Practically
the whole sale contract with warranty cost sharing does not coordinate the order quantity.
In fact, when both parties earn positive profit, we need parameters that
p− v + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) = λ(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K)).
Therefore the retailer stops ordering when the marginal sales ∂S(Q,K)∂Q reaches
W+cr−v
p−v+gr−θrP (Y≤K) ,
which is greater than the channel marginal sales at the optimum ∂S(Q,K)∂Q = c−vp−v+g−rP (Y≤K) .
Because the marginal sales S(Q,K) decreases with Q, the retailer orders less than the chan-
nel optimum. 2
12.3 Lemmas and Theorems of Revenue Sharing Contracts
Proof. Lemma 5.1.1
As long as the retailer earns a positive profit we have
(p− v)φ+ gr > 0.
Its profit function is then concave because
∂2Πr
∂Q2 = ((p− v)φ+ gr)∂
2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= ((p− v)φ+ gr)(−f(Q|K))
< 0.
Thus for fixed K the sufficient condition to optimize the retailer’s profit with respect to
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Q is
∂Πr
∂Q
= [(p− v)φ+ gr] ∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
− (W + cr − vφ) = 0.
That is,
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
W + cr − vφ
(p− v)φ+ gr) .
From 3.3.3 we know the supply chain optimal Q satisfies
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
c− v
p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K) .
Since
∂S(Q)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|k)
is decreasing in Q for given K, the necessary and sufficient condition for coordination is
c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) =
W + cr − vφ
(p− v)φ+ gr .
That is the retailer’s profit function is an affine function of the supply chain’s
Πr = λ(Π + gµ(K))− grµ(K).
and
φ(p− v) + gr = λ(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K));
W + cr − vφ = λ(c− v).
For both party to obtain positive profits we require 0 < λ < 1. This is made possible
if W < cs − (1 − φ)v. This is made possible by revenue sharing. The manufacturer first
charges a small premium for each unit ordered. Though this amount is not enough to cover
its production cost, its revenue share through the retail sale will cover the production cost
and earns a positive profit. It is shown that under the above condition the manufacturer
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earns a positive profit of
Πs = (1− λ)Π + µ(K)(gr − λg).
From this we derive the range of λ for both party to earn a positive profit is
grµ(K)
Π + gµ(K)
< λ <
Π+ grµ(K)
Π + gµ(K)
.
2
Proof. Lemma 5.1.2 As long as the manufacturer earns a positive profit we have
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K) > 0.
The manufacturer’s profit is concave in Q, as
∂2Πs
∂Q2
= ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0.
Thus given K and other contract parameters the necessary and sufficient condition to max-
imize the manufacturer’s profit is
∂Πs
∂Q
= ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (y ≤ K))∂S(q;K)
∂Q
− (cs −W − (1− φ)v) = 0,
which means,
∂S(q;K)
∂Q
=
cs −W − (1− φ)v
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (y ≤ K))
We know that under coordination the optimal Q∗ satisfies
∂S(q;K)
∂Q
|Q∗ = c− v
p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K)
and the condition to reach the coordination is specified in equations (5.1.4) as
φ(p− v) + gr = λ(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))
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W + cr − vφ = λ(c− v),
which basically means,
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K) = (1− λ)(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))
cs −W − (1− φ)v = (1− λ)(c− v)
. So
∂S(q;K)
∂Q
|Q∗ = c− v
p+ g − v − rP (y ≤ K) =
cs −W − (1− φ)v
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (y ≤ K)) .
At the supply chain optimal order quantity Q∗, the manufacturer’s maximum profit is also
achieved. 2
Proof. Lemma 5.1.3
The first order condition with respect to K of the manufacturer profit is,
∂Πs
∂K = −rS(Q,K)∂P (Y≤K)∂K + ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)∂K − gs ∂µ(K)∂K
= 0.
(12.3.1)
We know that the first order condition of the supply chain is,
∂Π
∂K = −rS(Q,K)∂P (Y≤K)∂K + (p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)∂K − g µ(K)∂K
= 0.
Because
∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
= βe−βK > 0,
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
= −
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD > 0,
and
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∂µ(K)
∂K
= −
∫ ∞
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD >
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
> 0,
it is possible for some probability function F (D|K) to satisfy above first order conditions
simultaneously. If the contract coordinates with K∗, it must satisfy
[(p−v)(1−φ)+gs−rP (Y ≤ K)]∂S(Q,K)
∂K
−gs ∂µ(K)
∂K
= [p−v+g−rP (Y ≤ K)]∂S(Q,K)
∂K
−gµ(K)
∂K
.
(12.3.2)
From 5.1.4 we derive that
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K) = (1− λ) [p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K)] .
Let p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) = x, the above coordination condition is
(1− λ)x∂S(Q,K)
∂K
− gs ∂µ(K)
∂K
= x
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
− gµ(K)
∂K
.
That is, the coordinating λ∗ must satisfy
λ∗ =
g − gs
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) ·
∂µ(K)
∂K |K∗
∂S(Q,K)
∂K |K∗
.
Because ∂µ(K)∂K |K∗> ∂S(Q,K)∂K |K∗ , g−gs = gr < p−v+g−rP (Y ≤ K) usually, it is possible
that grµ(K
∗)
Π+gµ(K∗) < λ
∗ < Π+grµ(K
∗)
Π+gµ(K∗) .
Thus if the profit functions are concave in (Q,K), the contract is able to coordinate the
supply chain in Q and K if
grµ(K∗)
Π + gµ(K∗)
<
gr
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) ·
∂µ(K)
∂K |K∗
∂S(Q,K)
∂K |K∗
<
Π+ grµ(K∗)
Π + gµ(K∗)
.
The coordination condition is
λ∗ =
gr
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) ·
∂µ(K)
∂K |K∗
∂S(Q,K)
∂K |K∗
.
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The optimal Q∗ and K∗ satisfy
∂Π
∂K
|K∗= −rS(Q∗,K∗)∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
|K∗ +(p−v+g−rP (y ≤ K∗))∂S(Q,K)
∂K
|K∗ −g ∂µ(K)
∂K
= 0
1− F (Q∗|K∗) = c− v
p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K∗) .
The profit allocation at coordination is
Πr = λ∗(Π + gµ(K∗))− grµ(K∗)
Πs = (1− λ∗)(Π + gµ(K∗))− gsµ(K∗).
2
Proof. Lemma 5.2.1 As long as the retailer earns a positive profit we have
(p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) > 0.
Its profit function is then concave because
∂2Πr
∂Q2 = ((p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K))∂
2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= ((p− v)φ+ gr)(−f(Q|K))
< 0.
Thus for fixed K the sufficient condition to optimize the retailer’s profit with respect to
Q is
∂Πr
∂Q
= [(p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K)] ∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
− (W + cr − vφ) = 0.
That is,
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
W + cr − vφ
(p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K)) .
118
From 3.3.3 we know the supply chain optimal Q satisfies
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
=
c− v
p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K) .
Since
∂S(Q)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|k)
is decreasing in Q for given K, the necessary and sufficient condition for coordination is
c− v
p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K) =
W + cr − vφ
(p− v)φ+ gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) .
That is the retailer’s profit function is an affine function of the supply chain’s
Πr = λ(Π + gµ(K))− grµ(K).
and
φ(p− v) + gr − θrP (Y ≤ K) = λ(p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K))W + cr − vφ = λ(c− v).
The manufacturer earns a positive profit of
Πs = (1− λ)Π + µ(K)(gr − λg).
From this we derive the range of λ for both party to earn a positive profit is
grµ(K)
Π + gµ(K)
< λ <
Π+ grµ(K)
Π + gµ(K)
.
2
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Proof. Lemma 5.2.2 For any given Q, the first order condition of the manufacturer is,
∂Πs
∂K = −(1− θ)rS(Q,K)∂P (Y≤K)∂K + ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)∂K
= 0.
(12.3.3)
We know that the first order condition of the supply chain is,
∂Π
∂K = −rS(Q,K)∂P (Y≤K)∂K + (p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)∂K
= 0.
Because
∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
= βe−βK > 0,
and
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
= −
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD > 0,
it is possible for some probability function F (D|K) to satisfy above first order conditions
simultaneously. If the contract coordinates with K∗, it must satisfy the necessary but not
sufficient condition of
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) = (1− θ) [p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K)] . (12.3.4)
If the integrated chain’s profit function is concave,
∂2Π
∂K2 = −rS(Q,K)∂
2P (Y≤K)
∂K2 − 2r ∂P (Y≤K)∂K ∂S(Q,K)∂K + [p+ g − v − rP (Y ≤ K)] ∂S
2(Q,K)
∂K2
< 0.
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The manufacturer’s profit function is then concave, too, because
∂2Πs
∂K2
=− (1− θ)rS(Q,K)∂
2P (Y ≤ K)
∂K2
− 2(1− θ)r ∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
+
[(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K)] ∂S
2(Q,K)
∂K2
=(1− θ) ∂
2Π
∂K2
<0.
The above first order conditions are then sufficient for optimization. From 5.2.3 we know
that
(p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) = (1− λ) [p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K)] .
Thus the warranty and quantity decisions are automatically coordinated if and only if θ = λ.
2
12.4 Lemmas and Theorems of Efficiency of Non-coordinating Contracts
Proof. Theorem 10.1.1
We know the retailer’s expected profit
Πr(Q;W,K) = (W + cr − v)[ p− v + gr
W + cr − vS(Q)−Q]− grµ(K),
the supply chain’s expected profit
ΠD(Q,K) = (c− v)[p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K)
c− v S(Q)−Q]− grµ(K).
Because W + cr− v > c− v and the retailer retains profit less than supply chain, p−v+grW+cr−v <
p−v+g−rP (y≤K)
c−v . That is,
c− v < (p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))(W + cr − v)
p− v + gr
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At optimal Q∗r , F¯ (Q
∗
r) =
W+cr−v
p−v+gr . Therefore,
∂ΠD(Q,K)
∂W = −(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))F¯ (Q∗r) 1f(Q∗r)(p−v+gr) + (c− v)
1
f(Q∗r)(p−v+gr)
= (− 1f(Q∗r)(p−v+gr) )[
(p−v+g−rP (y≤K))(W+cr−v)
p−v+gr − (c− v)]
≤ 0.
The decentralized supply chain’s profit decreases with wholesale price. As efficiency EQ =
ΠD
Πo , we have EQ also decrease with W . Higher wholesale price makes the supply chain less
efficient. 2
Proof. Theorem 10.1.2
Demand D is distributed on [0,+∞). When D = 0, its IGFR Q∗rf(Q∗r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
= 0; when D =
Max(D), its IGFR Q
∗
rf(Q
∗
r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
= +∞. So the domain of IGFR is [0,+∞).
Let ε be the least upper bound on the set of points such that g(ε) = Q
∗
rf(Q
∗
r)
F¯ (Q∗r)
≤ p−v+g−rP (y≤K)p−v+gr .
Thus on [0, ε],
(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− g(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)] ≥ 0.
Because F¯ (Q) is decreasing on Q, and g(Q) is increasing on Q, we have
Πs
Q∗r
= F¯ (Q∗r)[(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− g(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)]− (c− v)
decreasing on [0, ε]. Πs is concave on this domain and the optimal Q∗s is obtained from
Πs
Q∗r
= 0. That is,
Q∗s = Q
∗
r =
F¯ (Q∗r)(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− (c− v)
f(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)
If cr, v, gr, gs = 0
Q∗s = Q
∗
r =
F¯ (Q∗r)(p− rP (y ≤ K))− cs
f(Q∗r)p
,
For any Q∗r ∈ (ε,+∞), because g(Q∗r) > p−v+g−rP (y≤K)p−v+gr , the first order derivative of Πs to
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Q∗r
Πs
Q∗r
= F¯ (Q∗r)[(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− g(Q∗r)(p− v + gr)]− (c− v) < −(c− v) < 0.
Πs is decreasing and the maximum Πs on (ε,+∞) is smaller than the Πs of Q∗r on [0, ε].
To summarize, if demand distribution is IGFR, the manufacturer profit function is uni-
modal and the optimal Q∗s is obtained from
Πs(Q
∗
r ;Q
∗
r(W ),K)
Q∗r
= 0 as
Q∗s =
F¯ (Q∗s)(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))− (c− v)
f(Q∗s)(p− v + gr)
.
This solution is unique. The above equation can be written as
Q∗sf(Q
∗
s)
F¯ (Q∗s)
=
(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))
p− v + gr −
(c− v)
(p− v + gr)(F¯ (Q∗s))
.
If demand is IGFR, there is only one Q∗s that satisfies above. Here is the proof.
Assume Q′s 6= Q∗s also satisfies above.
If Q′s > Q
∗
s, because f(Q) is IGFR, the LHS of the equation
Q′sf(Q
′
s)
F¯ (Q′s)
>
Q∗sf(Q
∗
s)
F¯ (Q∗s)
; but because
F¯ (Q′s) < F¯ (Q
∗
s), the RHS is less than that of Q
∗
s. So Q
′
s cannot be greater than Q
∗
s.
Same as above, if Q′s < Q
∗
s, because f(Q) is IGFR, the LHS of the equation
Q′sf(Q
′
s)
F¯ (Q′s)
<
Q∗sf(Q
∗
s)
F¯ (Q∗s)
; but because F¯ (Q′s) > F¯ (Q
∗
s), the RHS is greater than that of Q
∗
s. So Q
′
s cannot
be smaller than Q∗s. Q
′
s can only be same as Q
∗
s to satisfy the first order condition. Thus
Q∗s is the unique optimal solution of Πs given demand distribution is IGFR.
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13. Appendix 2 Concavity of the profit functions
13.1 Concavity of Chain Profit Function
Some useful results
∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
= βe−βK > 0,
∂S(Q,K)
∂K
= −
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD > 0,
∂µ(K)
∂K
= −
∫ ∞
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD > 0,
∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
= 1− F (Q|K) > 0,
∂2S(Q,K)
∂Q2
= −f(Q|K) < 0,
The chain profit function is concave in (Q,K) if and only if
∂2Π
∂Q2
< 0,
∂2Π
∂K2
< 0,
∂2Π
∂Q2
· ∂
2Π
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Π
∂Q∂K
)2 > 0.
The profit function
Π(Q,K) = (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− (c− v)q − gµ(K)
is concave in Q, as
∂Π
∂Q
= (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂Q
− (c− v)
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∂2Π
∂Q2
= (p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0.
The profit function may or may not be concave in K, as
∂Π
∂K
= (p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂S(Q,K)
∂K
− rS(Q,K)∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
= (p− v − rP (Y ≤ K))(−
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD)− rS(Q,K)βe−βK + g
∫ ∞
Q
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD,
∂2Π
∂K2
=− (p− v − rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + r
∂P (Y ≤ K)
∂K
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD
− rβe−βK ∂S(Q,K)
∂K
+ rS(Q,K)β2e−βK + g
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD
=− (p− v − rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + 2rβe−βK
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD
+ rβ2e−βKS(Q,K) + g
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD.
The cross derivative of Π to (Q,K) is
∂2Π
∂K∂Q
= −(p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
− rβe−βK(1− F (Q|K)).
The Hessian determinant is
∂2Π
∂Q2
· ∂
2Π
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Π
∂Q∂K
)2
=(p− v + g − rP (y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K))[−(p− v − rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD+
2rβe−βK
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + rβ2e−βKS(Q,K) + g
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD]−
[−(p− v + g − rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
− rβe−βK(1− F (Q|K))]2.
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13.2 Concavity of Revenue Sharing Contract with Manufacturer Taking All
Warranty Cost
13.2.1 Concavity of Retailer’s Profit Function
The retailer’s profit function is
Πr(W, q,K) = ((p− v)φ+ gr)S(Q,K)− (W + cr − vφ)Q− grµ(K).
It is concave in (Q,K) if and only if
∂2Πr
∂Q2
< 0,
∂2Πr
∂K2
< 0,
∂2Πr
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πr
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πr
∂Q∂K
)2 > 0.
We know that
∂2Πr
∂Q2
= ((p− v)φ+ gr)(−f(Q|K)) < 0,
∂2Πr
∂K2
= −(p− v)φ
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + gr
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD,
and
∂2Πr
∂Q∂K
= −(φ(p− v) + gr)∂F (Q|K)
∂K
,
so,
∂2Πr
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πr
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πr
∂Q∂K
)2
=((p− v)φ+ gr)(−f(Q|K)) · [−(p− v)φ
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD+
gr
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD]− [(φ(p− v) + gr)∂F (Q|K)
∂K
]2.
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13.2.2 Concavity of Manufacturer’s Profit Function
The manufacturer’s profit function is
Πs(W, q,K) = ((p−v)(1−φ)+gs−rP (Y ≤ K))S(Q,K)− ((cs−W )−v(1−φ))Q−gsµ(K).
It is concave in (Q,K) if and only if
∂2Πs
∂Q2
< 0,
∂2Πs
∂K2
< 0,
∂2Πs
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πs
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πs
∂Q∂K
)2 > 0.
We know that
∂2Πs
∂Q2
= ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0,
∂2Πs
∂K2
=− ((p− v)(1− φ)− rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + 2rβe(−βK)
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD
+ rβ2e−βKS(Q,K) + gs
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD,
and
∂2Πs
∂Q∂K
= −((1− φ)(p− v) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
− rβe−βK(1− F (Q|K)),
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so,
∂2Πs
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πs
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πs
∂Q∂K
)2
=((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K))
[−((p− v)(1− φ)− rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + 2rβe(−βK)∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + rβ2e−βKS(Q,K) + gs
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD]−
[((1− φ)(p− v) + gs − rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
+ rβe−βK(1− F (Q|K))]2.
13.3 Concavity of Revenue Sharing Contract with Warranty Cost Sharing
13.3.1 Concavity of Retailer’s Profit Function
The retailer’s profit function is
Πr = [(p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr]S(Q,K)− (W + cr − vφ)Q− grµ(K).
It is concave in (Q,K) if and only if
∂2Πr
∂Q2
< 0,
∂2Πr
∂K2
< 0,
∂2Πr
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πr
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πr
∂Q∂K
)2 > 0.
We know that
∂2Πr
∂Q2
= ((p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr)(−f(Q|K)) < 0,
∂2Πr
∂K2
=− ((p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD+
2θrβe−βK
∫ ∞
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + gr
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + θrβ2e−βKS(Q,K),
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and
∂2Πr
∂Q∂K
= −(φ(p− v)− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr)∂F (Q|K)
∂K
− θrβe−βK(1− F (Q|K)),
so,
∂2Πr
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πr
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πr
∂Q∂K
)2
=((p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr)(−f(Q|K))[−((p− v)φ− θrP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD
+ 2θrβe−βK
∫ ∞
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + gr
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + θrβ2e−βKS(Q,K)]
− [(φ(p− v)− θrP (Y ≤ K) + gr)∂F (Q|K)
∂K
+ θrβe−βK(1− F (Q|K))]2
13.3.2 Concavity of Manufacturer’s Profit Function
The manufacturer’s profit function is
Πs = [(p− v)(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K) + gs]S(Q,K)− (cs −Ws − v(1− φ))Q− gsµ(K).
It is concave in (Q,K) if and only if
∂2Πs
∂Q2
< 0,
∂2Πs
∂K2
< 0,
∂2Πs
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πs
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πs
∂Q∂K
)2 > 0.
We know that
∂2Πs
∂Q2
= ((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K)) < 0,
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∂2Πs
∂K2
=− ((p− v)(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD
+ 2(1− θ)rβe(−βK)
∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + (1− θ)rβ2e−βKS(Q,K)
+ gs
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD,
and
∂2Πr
∂Q∂K
= −((1−φ)(p−v)+gs−(1−θ)rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
−(1−θ)rβe−βK(1−F (Q|K)),
so,
∂2Πr
∂Q2
· ∂
2Πr
∂K2
− ( ∂
2Πr
∂Q∂K
)2
=((p− v)(1− φ) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))(−f(Q|K))
[−((p− v)(1− φ)− (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))
∫ Q
0
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD + 2(1− θ)rβe(−βK)∫ Q
0
∂F (D|K)
∂K
dD + (1− θ)rβ2e−βKS(Q,K) + gs
∫ ∞
Q
∂2F (D|K)
∂K2
dD]−
[((1− φ)(p− v) + gs − (1− θ)rP (Y ≤ K))∂F (Q|K)
∂K
+ (1− θ)rβe−βK(1− F (Q|K))]2
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14. Appendix 3 Tables
Table 14.1: Results of Revenue and Warranty Sharing Contract
K Q∗ Π Πr Πs %ofMaximum
0 546 21660 6539 15121 97.4%
1 574 21919 6638 15281 98.5%
2 601 22099 6709 15390 99.3%
3 629 22205 6754 15451 99.8%
4 657 22245 6775 15470 100.0%
5 684 22224 6774 15450 99.9%
6 712 22150 6754 15395 99.6%
7 740 22026 6717 15309 99.0%
8 767 21858 6663 15195 98.3%
9 795 21651 6595 15056 97.3%
10 823 21409 6515 14894 96.2%
Table 14.2: Sensitivity to Order Amount
K Q Π Πr Πs
Optimal 4 657 22244 6774 15469
Actual 4 525 19496 6197 13299
% to Optimal 100% 80% 87.6% 91.5% 86.0%
131
Table 14.3: Fair Profit Allocation: Zero Lost Sale cost
Chain Retailer Manufacturer
Profit 22601 9175 13426
Percentage 41% 59%
Cost 49454 20781 28673
Percentage 42% 58%
Table 14.4: Fair Profit Allocation: Lost Sale cost as Lost Profit
Chain Retailer Manufacturer
Profit 21755 8894 12861
Percentage 41% 59%
Cost 52086 21748 30338
Percentage 42% 58%
Lost Sale Cost 37 15 22
Percentage 41% 59%
Table 14.5: Impact of Quality Improvement on Coordination
β K∗ Q∗ Π %Increase Πr %Increase Πs %Increase
20 4 657 22245 0.0% 6775 0.0% 15470 0.0%
21 5 685 22516 1.2% 6873 1.4% 15643 1.1%
22 6 713 22820 2.6% 6980 3.0% 15839 2.4%
23 7 742 23151 4.1% 7097 4.8% 16054 3.8%
24 8 770 23505 5.7% 7220 6.6% 16285 5.3%
25 9 799 23879 7.3% 7350 8.5% 16529 6.8%
Table 14.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Demand Responsiveness
b Chain $ Retailer $ % Manufacturer $ % Q K Demand Mean Sales
(1.0e+004) (1.0e+004) (1.0e+004)
25 2.17 0.478 22.0% 1.691 78.0% 566 0.9 522 500
26 2.17 0.474 21.8% 1.700 78.2% 584 1.6 542 520
27 2.18 0.472 21.6% 1.711 78.4% 603 2.3 563 540
28 2.20 0.471 21.4% 1.724 78.6% 622 3.0 583 560
29 2.21 0.470 21.3% 1.739 78.7% 641 3.6 604 580
30 2.22 0.470 21.1% 1.755 78.9% 661 4.1 624 600
31 2.24 0.470 21.0% 1.773 79.0% 680 4.7 645 620
32 2.26 0.471 20.8% 1.791 79.2% 699 5.2 665 640
33 2.28 0.472 20.7% 1.810 79.3% 718 5.6 686 660
34 2.30 0.474 20.6% 1.831 79.4% 738 6.1 706 680
35 2.33 0.476 20.4% 1.852 79.6% 757 6.5 726 700
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